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Abstract 
Roald Amundsen’s expeditions in his late career, from 1918 to 1926, became increasingly 
dependent upon a close cooperation with the media. The media cooperating with Amundsen 
were primarily positive in their coverage, as negative factors were seldom printed. Towards 
the end of the period investigated, the cooperation became so close that it may be called a 
defining factor. After the Maud expedition, the expeditions were decreasingly related to 
science and increasingly related to sensation and sport. This trend culminated with the 
Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight. Amundsen, although important, became less 
and less of a critical factor to the completion of his expeditions, as he became increasingly 
dependent on others to use advanced technology such as airplanes and airships that relied on 
large-scale logistics to function. He also became increasingly celebrated and magnified as a 
resource to further the agendas of nations, institutions and individuals.  
Oppsummering 
Roald Amundsens ekspedisjoner i den siste delen av karrieren hans, fra 1918 til 1926, ble 
gradvis mer avhengige av et tett samarbeid med media. Mediene som samarbeidet med 
Amundsen hadde hovedsakelig en positiv vinkling på nyhetene om ham og hans 
ekspedisjoner, og negative faktorer ble sjelden nevnt. Mot slutten av perioden som undersøkes 
ble dette samarbeidet så tett at det kan kalles en definerende faktor. Etter Maud-ekspedisjonen 
fokuserte ekspedisjonene i stadig mindre grad på vitenskap og i stadig større grad på 
sensasjon og sport. Denne trenden kulminerte med Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar 
Flight. Selv om Amundsen var viktig, ble hans tilstedeværelse i stadig mindre grad en 
avgjørende faktor for at ekspedisjonene hans kunne fullføres, siden han ble mer og mer 
avhengig av andre som kunne betjene avansert teknologi som fly og luftskip, som var 
avhengig av omfattende logistikk for å kunne fungere. Amundsen ble også i økende grad 
feiret og hyllet, og ble dermed en ressurs som kunne brukes for å fremme nasjoner, 
institusjoner og enkeltpersoners agendaer.  
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1 
Introduction, thesis and sources 
“I stood there and watched the machine in the air, thinking of my long sled trip over the 
Antarctic. In one hour it covered distances in the polar areas one would have used days and 
had much hardship traversing with a sleigh.
3” 
 
Roald Amundsen was the world’s most famous and successful polar explorer. The popular 
image of Amundsen was that of a hero, an individual with an unbending will who did things 
no other man had managed to do. When he died in 1928, he had circumnavigated the Arctic, 
conquered the South Pole and flown over the Arctic basin and the North Pole. The early 
career of Amundsen, from his first expedition with Gjøa to his conquest of the South Pole, 
has been the subject of many historians and numerous literary accounts.  
Tor Bomann-Larsen discovered new material on Amundsen. This led to his biography Roald 
Amundsen – en biografi, published in 1995. Historians have also used the new material in the 
three-volume work Norsk Polarhistorie I – III, published in 2004. The historians’ work show 
that there are still many unresolved questions with regards Amundsen’s activities after the 
South Pole, and they need to be studied in further detail. Amundsen’s late life was turbulent, 
problematic and puzzling. It shows that Amundsen was a complex individual. His underlying 
problem after the conquest of the South Pole was to maintain the image as the world’s leading 
polar explorer in an age of rapid change. Amundsen knew that his inherited, traditional mode 
of exploration was becoming obsolete. To study how he made the transition to modern 
exploration, one has to go back to his mentor, Fridtjof Nansen. 
Nansen is important because it appears that he attempted to create a new definition of what it 
was to be Norwegian. In the early 20
th
 century, it was common to talk about nations of culture 
and civilization. The world was divided into classes. Based on a Darwinist view of survival of 
the fittest, nations were judged by the biology and the “eugenics” of its people, and given a 
place in the hierarchy of nations. Industrial production, innovation, science, and military 
                                                          
3
Roald Amundsen sited in Aftenposten. Year 66. No 166. Saturday, 1 April 1925. Author’s translation. 
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standing were important, as they were used as markers for what made a nation fittest to 
survive. On top of this list were the European races
4
, at the bottom the Africans. Within 
Europe, the hierarchy was a bit more nuanced. The question was; where did the new nation of 
Norway fit in? Given that Norway only gained its independence in 1905, what had Norway 
done for the civilized world? What advances had this tiny nation on the edge of the eternal ice 
brought to the stage of culture, conquest, science, technology or industry? How was Norway 
equipped for the struggle of survival? Fridtjof Nansen, who began his career as an explorer by 
crossing Greenland in 1888, led the way with his Arctic drift with the ship Fram from 1893 to 
1896. His actions with Fram have been seen as the beginning of a contemporary campaign to 
make Norway a polar nation. Narve Fulsås writes in “En æressag for vor nation” (“A question 
of glory for our nation”) that Fridtjof Nansen’s expedition with Fram was a national issue 
with the goal to unite Norwegians in a time when the nation was split between those who 
wished to end the union with Sweden, and those who did not.
5
 Seen from this perspective, the 
Norwegian government funded the expedition in order to further the cause of Norway and to 
ensure that the expedition made scientific contributions to civilization. The return of Nansen 
was important for two reasons: First, it made Norway known for polar activities.
6
 Second, due 
to the telegraph and the mass media, his survival became as simultaneous celebration all over 
the nation (and the world) as a national achievement.
7
 
In En norsk elite, Bodil Stenseth states that Nansen was a central character of the 
Lysakerkretsen (the Lysaker group), consisting of neonational romantic artists and writers.
8
 
Here, the ancient, represented by the proverbial Vikings, and the modern were fused. This 
group had significant impact on how one viewed what it was to be Norwegian as well as on 
the Norwegian cultural heritage. At the time, a retranslation of the Snorre saga used Fridtjof 
Nansen as a model for the illustrations of the Viking king Olav Trygvasson.
9
 This fusion 
appears to have been influenced by Thomas Carlyle and his book Heroes and hero worship, 
where he makes a connection between the strong man and history. The history and society 
                                                          
4
 Roy, William G. Making Societies. The Historical Construction of Our World. Boston: Pine Forge Press, 2001. 
On race: 74-109. Race and identity: 104. 
5
 Fulsås, Arve. “En æresag for vor nation” in Einar Arne Drivnes, Harald Dag Jølle (ed). Norsk Polarhistorie I. 
Ekspedisjonene. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2004. 193–194.  
6
 Fulsås Norsk Polarhistorie I 2004. 195. 
7
 Fulsås Norsk Polarhistorie I 2004. 196. 
8
 Stenseth, Bodil. En norsk elite: Nasjonsbyggerne på Lysaker 1890–1940. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1993; Fredheim, 
Arnt. "Lysakerkretsen" Store Norske Leksikon. Copyright: Store Norske Leksikon. URL: 
http://snl.no/Lysakerkretsen 
9
 Hødnebø, Finn. (ed.) Snorre de første kongene Del 1 Norges kongesagaer av Snorre Sturlason. Oslo: J. M. 
Stenersens Forlag AS, 2007. See illustrations page 157 ,159, 165 and 169.  
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known at the time was the result of work done by great men.
10
 Nansen was seen as such a 
man, and Nansen saw Amundsen as such a man. He made this clear during the memorial 
service after Amundsen’s death.11 Included in the group was also Nordahl Rolfsen12, whose 
illustrated reading books for children were an essential part of the Norwegian language 
education from the first edition and well into the 1960’s. Eric Hobsbawm writes in The 
Invention of Tradition that the period from 1870 to 1914 was an era when traditions were 
mass-produced. The dominant type of invented tradition was the type that sought to establish 
or symbolize membership in a group, social cohesion, or a nation.
13
 In this case the invention 
of the polar nation as a social cohesion for the new nation of Norway. Inventing national 
traditions was essential, with emphasis on “(...) nationalism, the nation-state, national 
symbols, histories and the rest.” In Norway, there appears to have been a need to create a new 
way of looking at what was Norwegian and where Norway belonged in a global context. 
Hobsbawm states that where there was a need, “(...) the state linked both formal and informal, 
official and unofficial, political and social inventions of traditions (...).”14 The work of Nansen 
and his influence with leading members of Norway’s cultural life may have created a 
tradition, and this might be interpreted as the invention of the tradition of Norway as the polar 
nation. The tradition that Norway was a polar nation was invented in the 1890’s, through 
Nansen’s work and the work of his Lysakerkrets. But the issue is not as simple as this could 
lead us to believe. In Jakten på det norske, Øystein Sørensen mentions 11 different political 
movements that attempted to define Norway as a nation before 1905, and this does not 
include the polar nation.
15
 Sørensen writes that one has to look at the strength and intensity of 
the Norwegian identity, in comparison to other identities.
16
  
Amundsen benefited from his early cooperation with Nansen. Nansen and Otto Sverdrup had 
developed radical new ways of exploring the north, in cooperation with and inspired by Arctic 
natives.
17
 The use of dogs, sleighs, skis, Inuit clothing and meticulous planning were crucial 
                                                          
10
 Thomas Carlyle, Om herosdyrkelse eller store mænd, deres væsen og betydning. Bergen: Ed. B. Giertsens 
forlag, 1888. 1–2.  
11
 Nansen, Fridtjof in A. H. Winsnes (ed) Nansens Røst Artikler og Taler av Fridtjof Nansen II 1908–1930. Oslo: 
Jacob Dybwads forlag, 1942. 691–697. 
12Author of popular children’s reading books; Johnsen, Egil Børre, "Nordahl Rolfsen", Store Norske Leksikon, 
Copyright Store Norske Leksikon,: URL: http://snl.no/.nbl_biografi/Nordahl_Rolfsen/utdypning (13.10.2011). 
13
 Hobsbawm, Eric. Invention of Tradition London: Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995. 9.  
14
 Hobsbawm. Invention of Tradition. 1995. 264.  
15
 Sørensen, Øystein. ”Hegemonikamp og det norske, Elitens nasjonsbyggingsprosjekter 1770–1945” in Øystein 
Sørensen (ed) Jakten på det norske. Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet. 
Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2001. 17–42. 
16
 Sørensen. Jakten på det norske. 2001. 15. 
17
 Riffenburg, Beau. The Myth of the Explorer. London: Belhaven press, 1993. 114. 
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factors. They invented what was considered the traditional Norwegian mode of exploration, 
and their work made Norway a reputable polar nation. When Amundsen (and his men) went 
south, they perfected the methods pioneered by Nansen and Sverdrup. 
In literature, Amundsen’s biographer Tor Bomann-Larsen flatly states that Amundsen was not 
a nation builder, he built himself. Amundsen had no agenda regarding the future of Norway; 
he had barely asked himself basic political questions.
18
 This was in stark contrast to Fridtjof 
Nansen, who Carl Emil Vogt in Fridtjof Nansen mannen og verden, states not only wanted to 
create a new Norway, he also wanted to make a new and better world.
19
 This is also made 
clear by Bomann-Larsen, who claims that Amundsen had become a great man, but a small 
Nansen.
20
 Despite Amundsen not being a nation builder, his expeditions can be seen as a way 
to define Norway symbolically, and to make Norway known in the world.  
During the early parts of his career, Amundsen was dedicated to research and science, it was 
his later actions to become more sensational that made Amundsen break with science.
21
 Gjøa 
was his first expedition. This expedition was based on science and achieved an international 
first simultaneously, as he sailed through the Northwest Passage. Amundsen’s conquest of the 
South Pole made him famous for achieving his goal and notorious because he deceived his 
nation and Nansen. Amundsen was not supposed to conquer the South Pole; he was to make a 
polar drift across the Arctic basin and to scientific research.
22
 The initial idea was launched in 
1908, in the Geographical Society in Norway
23
. It was to be the third expedition with 
Nansen’s Fram. The first had been Nansen’s own polar drift, and the second had been Otto 
Sverdrup’s mapping and exploration of Ellesmere Island, between Greenland and Canada. 
Amundsen’s Fram III expedition was not directed towards the North Pole, however, it was 
used to conquer the South Pole.  
It appears that Amundsen’s dedication to science began to wane after the South Pole 
expedition. Nansen demanded that Amundsen complete what he had promised, to drift over 
the Arctic basin, as he should have done with Fram III,
24
 conducting a scientific study. The 
Maud expedition was the last classic, Norwegian drift expedition. It was both a continuation 
                                                          
18
 Tor Bomann-Larsen. Roald Amundsen. Oslo: J. W. Cappelens forlag AS 1995. 100. 
19
 Vogt, Carl Emil. Fridtjof Nansen mannen og verden Oslo: Cappelen Damm AS, 2011. 269.  
20
 Bomann-Larsen. Roald Amundsen. 1995. 100. 
21
 Friedman, Robert Marc. ”Amundsen, Nansen, and the question of science: dramatizing historical research on 
the polar heroic. ” Endeavour (2011) URL: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.endeavour.2011.08.004 
22
 Jølle, Harald Dag ”Nansen: Oppdageren” Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS, 2011. 409-410. 
23
 Amundsen, Roald. Nordostpassagen. Kristiania: Gyldendalske boghandel, 1921. 1. 
24
Kjærheim, Steinar. Nansens Brev III, Letter 549 to Roald Amundsen, 2 April 1913.  
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of and carried out in Fridtjof Nansen’s spirit as a scientist. The goal of the expedition was to 
answer a number of unresolved questions related to the Arctic. It was done in the traditional 
Amundsen fashion, silently sneaking away from the dock, but the master-mind behind the 
expedition was Nansen, duly supported by the Norwegian government, which saw it all as a 
way to further Norwegian interests in the Arctic. 
Amundsen changed his mode of transportation after Maud. The full consequences of this 
change were not apparent at first. The traditional was swapped for the sensational. Amundsen 
was also to notice that the increased emphasis on sensation was not as easy at it may have 
seemed. The world in general had become air-minded, and in the USA, which Amundsen 
frequently visited, the concept of air travel had taken on religious aspects, as claimed by 
Joseph Corn in The Winged Gospel. Corn writes that the pace in which “miracles seemed to 
occur in the sky, thrilled contemporaries”, and that these miracles were in a way creating a 
new concept of time and distance. 
25
 These “holy” machines were used to explore the 
unknown Arctic, “the sublime desolation”, making instant heroes26, as with Byrd in America 
(and Amundsen in Norway).  
Airplanes and airships would also become an important part of Amundsen’s expeditions, and 
he became increasingly dependent on others to complete his expeditions. According to 
Airships in International Affairs, 1890–1940, airships were an important factor in 
international politics and the only man-made vessel thought to be effective in Arctic 
exploration.
27
 Guillaume de Syon states that the airship had a profound psychological impact 
on the imagination of the contemporary spirit, and that they made a strong impression on 
contemporary Europe.
28
 As Duggan and Meyer states: “Psychologically, for many an 
individual the airship was more than poetry. It represented anticipation of pleasure and wish-
fulfilment.”29  
The greatest technological challenge and logistical feat in any of Amundsen’s expeditions was 
the inclusion of an airship in his last expedition. Airships were rare, but in the 1920’s, they 
were part of the contemporary spirit and a yardstick for what an airplane had to achieve in 
                                                          
25
 Corn, Joseph. The Winged Gospel, America’s Romance with Aviation, 1900–1950. New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1983. 15. 
26
 Corn. The Winged Gospel. 1983. 15. 
27
 Duggan, John and Henry Cord Meyer. Airships in International Affairs, 1890–1940. Houndmills: Palgrave, 
2001. 105. 117–119. 
28
 de Syon, Guillaume. Zeppelin! Germany and the airship, 1900–1939. Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2002. 1-3. 
29
 Duggan and Meyer. Airships in International Affairs, 1890-1940. 2001. 5. 
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order to be competitive. In the 1920’s, the airship was the Rolls Royce of flying vessels. They 
were expensive, but were capable of delivering stunning achievements, both in range and 
durability. In 1917, the LZ 104 travelled 5,700 kilometres in 95 hours before landing, a feat 
that an airplane was not able to surpass or even match at the time, nor for many years to 
come.
30
 The airships’ achievements also made them sublime in a cultural-historical 
perspective. That Roald Amundsen, the world’s greatest polar explorer, ended his career by 
flying over the North Pole (the top of the world) in a machine that was one of the world’s 
most advanced, made a genuine impression on the contemporary world.  
Amundsen turned away from science and devoted himself more to sensation and sport as the 
most important means to achieve his goals and this became increasingly defining to his polar 
career after the Maud expedition. Amundsen had to cooperate with institutions such as Norsk 
Luftseiladsforening (NLF) in order to attract support from the media, private sponsors and 
individuals. His helpers also had to recruit personnel with the technical expertise necessary to 
achieve Amundsens ambitions. This happened simultaneously with his expertise and know-
how becoming less vital to a successful expedition. It is somewhat ironic that Amundsen in 
the end was worshipped as a national hero for activities where he in fact was a passive 
spectator.  
Thesis 
Media dependency and the commercialization of exploration increasingly defined Roald 
Amundsen’s expeditions. The media, which cooperated with Amundsen were primarily 
positive in their coverage; negative factors were seldom printed. The expeditions were 
decreasingly related to science and increasingly related to sensation and sport. Amundsen was 
less of a critical factor to the completion of his expeditions as he became increasingly 
dependent on others to use advanced technology that relied on large-scale logistics. 
Amundsen also became increasingly celebrated and magnified in order to further the agendas 
of others, such as the Norwegian and Italian governments and individuals. 
Media 
Media, newspapers, magazines, lectures, books and film; all were constantly obsessed with 
Amundsen. From the middle of the 1920’s, the previously objective and distant media 
changed its character as the relationship between the expeditions and the media became so 
                                                          
30
 de Syon, Zeppelin! Germany and the airship, 2002. 87. 
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close that it changed into something that can best be described as a protocooperatioon. The 
term protocooperatioon comes from biology and is the definition of two species cooperating 
for mutual benefit, although they do not need to cooperate to survive.  
The protocooperation concerns the commercialization of exploration, which needs further 
explanation. In The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century,
31
 Gerald J. 
Baldasty writes that there was a bond between news, advertisements and the reader. This bond 
was made explicit at the end of the nineteenth century, as newspapers were increasingly seen 
as a business and “(…) news were valued and defined within that context.”32 As a business, 
the goal was to earn a living for both the employees and the stockholder. The newspapers’ 
income came increasingly from advertisment space, which was sold based on the number of 
readers the newspaper had on a daily basis. Urbanization, industrialization, population growth 
and an increased focus on products made advertisments a major source of income.
33
 It was at 
this point that news became commercialized as “Publishers and editors realized that they 
could make large profits by pitching newspaper content to the masses and then selling their 
huge audiences to advertisers.”34 So newspapers largely stopped looking at news as a means 
to inform the populace on political preferences and currents events, but rather saw it as 
something to market.
35
 As newspapers began to pitch their content to the masses, they turned 
increasingly to sensation in order to sell their advertisments, and what could be more 
sensational than the exploration of the unkown polar areas by explorer heroes? 
In The Myth of the Explorer, Beau Riffenburgh writes on the relationship of the press and the 
explorer. Riffenburgh writes that the media’s interest in expeditions began with the 
urbanization of cities, as this was the first time when people had the opportunity to choose 
between several newspapers and bought the one with the most appealing front page. This 
forced the quality papers to adapt to sensational modes of selling their news, and exploration 
was one of the topics that became the most sensationalized in the 1880’s and 1890’s.36 
Riffenburg uses Nansen as an example of a man who became a living icon, a hero, by means 
of his appearance and character, as well as by how he returned from his famous attempt to 
reach the North Pole. His return was sensational: “To most of the world, Nansen’s 
                                                          
31
 Baldasty, Gerald J. The Commercializaton of News in the Ninetenth Century. Madison, Wisconsin: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. 
32
 Baldasty, The Commercialzation of News in the Nineteenth Century, 1992. 80. 
33
 Baldasty, The Commercialzation of News in the Nineteenth Century, 1992. 139. 
34
 Baldasty, The Commercialzation of News in the Nineteenth Century, 1992. 139. 
35
 Baldasty, The Commercialzation of News in the Nineteenth Century, 1992. 145. 
36
 Riffenburg, The Myth of the Explorer, 1993. 119–120. 
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reappearance was like that of a man returning from the dead.”37 Nansen became “(…) the 
darling of the international popular press (…).”38 He became a figure that was used in the 
popular press to sell their sensational news. Riffenburg views the Norwegian successors of 
Nansen as anacronistic. They were not in syncronization with the commercial aspects of 
exploration, as they did not perceive their activities as something to market. In the Anglo-
American experience, the explorer went to the Arctic to attain “fame and fortune”, and sold 
himself to the media.
39
 The Norwegian polar explorers post-Nansen were ignored in the 
American and English press due to the lack of sensationalism in their expeditions. Otto 
Sverdrup discovered and mapped significant tracts of new land, more than anyone since, but 
his work, his achievements and his results were ignored due to his way of matter-of-factly 
style of writing: “Otto Sverdrup’s account made his four years seem too easy, and gave 
visions of men in comfortable settings, well-fed, and able to enjoy their leisure time (…).” 40 
Seen from the Anglo-American point of view, Roald Amundsen fared no better, but his early 
career could not be ignored due to the monumental nature of his achievements. As Riffenburg 
claims, there was, however, always something obscure robbing Amundsen of his glory, such 
as the news being leaked during his journey through the Northwest Passage, and the death 
(and martyrdom) of Robert F. Scott during the race to the South Pole.
41
 Riffenburg states that 
the explorers from both the USA and Great Britain were used to the idea of selling themselves 
to the media in order to fund their expeditions, but this was a novelty in Norway. The 
Norwegian polar explorers did not receive much media attention because they did not create 
as much “fuss” about their adventures as their British and American contemporaries did. It 
was not until Roald Amundsen began to cooperate with Rolf Thommessen
42
 that Norwegian 
exploration became truly commercial. That cooperation evolved into something more, namely 
a protocooperation between the media and the explorer, where the “fuss” and danger were 
turned into coin, used to finance further expeditions and also to shed favourable light on 
others with their own agendas. 
                                                          
37
 Riffenburg, The Myth of the Explorer, 1993. 140. 
38
 Riffenburg, The Myth of the Explorer, 1993. 140. 
39
 Riffenburg. The Myth of the Explorer. 1993.153. 
40
 Riffenburg. The Myth of the Explorer. 1993. 161. 
41
 Riffenburg. The Myth of the Explorer. 1993. 162. 
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The foundation for this thesis consists of printed sources such as newspapers, contemporary 
accounts, the comic press, and literature. The newspaper material mainly originates from three 
newspapers, Aftenposten, Dagbladet and Tidens Tegn. These had large audiences in the 
capital, Kristiania (the name changed to Oslo in 1925). They were all newspapers of good 
repute during the time investigated, and representative of their day and age. Historically, the 
papers were different, as various part of the population formed their target audience. It must 
however be mentioned that Tidens Tegn lost much of it good reputation in the 1930’s, as the 
newspaper became increasingly influenced by right-wing ideals. Odd-Bjørn Fure writes in 
Norsk Utenrikspolitikk bind 3 that the press was divided into different social classes. Workers 
and workers’ papers were sympathetic to the Soviet Union, while the more middle-class 
papers, such as Aftenposten and Tidens Tegn, had an understanding of and sympathy for the 
Fascist type of government (but were not Fascist papers). Dagbladet was the exception.
43
 The 
newspapers in the capital Kristiania were located within a small geographical area close to 
Akersgaten. Aftenposten was founded in 1860 and has since the 1880’s been known to be both 
conservative and independent. During the time in question, it was in good standing, had a 
good leadership and was the leading advertisement agency. The paper printed between two 
and three issues daily and had sound finances.
44
 Statistics from Aftenposten show that about 
75 percent of all business leaders in Kristiania read the paper, but only thirteen percent of the 
workers and foremen.
45
 This only confirms that it was an upper middle-class newspaper with 
influence on leading members of society. At Aftenposten, it was Odd Arnesen who was the 
reporter writing on the Arctic and Antarctic news. He was known for his easy and entertaining 
style.
46
 However, most articles from Aftenposten were not signed, and it cannot be verified 
that Arnesen was the author unless explicitly stated. 
Dagbladet was founded in 1869, and at the time I am researching, the paper had a daily 
afternoon edition. The paper was known to focus on literature and the arts, and it was an 
organ for “culturally radical elements”47 as well. Dagbladet was not a part of what became the 
union between the media and the expeditions. The newspaper was the sceptic towards both 
Amundsen himself and his expeditions. Its independence from the expeditions is the main 
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reason why Dagbladet has been included. As an independent newspaper, it is less likely to 
conform to the thesis that Amundsen’s expeditions received positive coverage in the media 
and that negative factors were kept hidden from the general public. 
Tidens Tegn was founded in 1910 by Olav Thommessen. He had been the editor of Verdens 
Gang for years, but after a dispute, he and most of the staff left and founded their own paper. 
At its founding, it printed the political views of the liberal-conservative party Frisinnede 
Venstre.
48
 Tidens Tegn was a success from the very first edition, due to the professional staff 
and Thommessen’s popularity. Success led to more success, and the newspaper continued to 
grow. Rolf Thommessen (Olav Thommessen’s son) became editor-in-chief in 1917 and held 
the position until 1938. As he took over the newspaper, there was a decided shift in the 
paper’s style and views. In the 1920’s, the paper was dedicated to the struggle to make the 
polar areas a Norwegian domain. The Greenland struggle with Denmark was one of the issues 
the paper found interesting.
49
 Furthermore, the paper and its editor sympathized with and 
admired Fascist elements, such as the then new dictator of Italy, Benito Mussolini.
50
 Among 
his many positions, Thommessen was President of Norsk Luftseiladsforening (NLF), also 
known as the Aeroclub of Norway. Tidens Tegn hired out a journalist, Fredrik Ramm, to 
follow Roald Amundsen’s aerial expeditions as a paid (or embedded) correspondent. We will 
dwell on this later. Amundsen was very popular with the paper’s readers, and when he and 
Thommessen fell out, it caused such an upheaval that the newspaper had to open an office 
dedicated to handling all the readers who wanted to cancel their subscriptions.
51
 The paper 
ceased publication and its founding editor died in 1941. In addition to the above newspapers, 
other newspapers have been included to shed some light on the thesis from different angles. 
The comic press has also been included, as it gives a satirical look at Amundsen’s 
expeditions. The comic press is known for its ridicule, sharp satire and uncomfortable 
statement of the truth. The comic press was in no way scientific or objective, on the contrary, 
but it is apt at defining the essence of a complicated subject in a single sentence or a drawing. 
People read the comic press to get a cheap laugh, and at the same time receive a satirical view 
on current affairs. In Norway, the various magazines of the comic press usually led short 
lives. Old ones disappeared and new ones appeared, and there is little continuity. The comic 
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press also went through some major changes. The earlier magazines, from before the 1920’s, 
were mostly uniform in appearance, with political caricatures and satire. During the 1920’s 
some of the magazines lost their edge and transformed into pure joke rags. The magazines 
primarily used are Hvepsen (1905–1928, The Wasp) and Karikaturen (1917–1927, The 
Caricature). Others, such as Korsaren (The Corsair), are used sporadically. 
Politics 
Amundsen’s expeditions can be seen as a resource in politics and national affairs. At the time 
when the Maud expedition set out, well over thirty years after Fram I, Norway was in a state 
of polar expansion, as Odd Gunnar Skagestad writes in Norsk Polarpolitikk. Skagestad 
defines the Norwegian interest as a way to secure two types of national interest: Primarily 
economic, to secure its citizens’ economic activities in the area and secure possible resources 
for any future use. Second, to keep the national polar traditions alive in order to acquire 
national and international prestige.
52
 Skagestad also writes that from 1908 to 1919, Norway 
was a nation that probed the ground before launching a nationalist-expansive phase that lasted 
from 1919 to 1933.
53
 Thus, Roald Amundsen’s expeditions coincided with a phase of 
Norwegian polar policy marked by nationalist-expansive policies.  Ida Blom writes in 
Kampen om Eirik Raudes Land that from 1921 to 1933, Norway was engaged in a diplomatic 
struggle with Denmark over the supremacy of East Greenland, an area that represented 
Norwegian economic interests and to which Norway had “historical” bonds. During this time, 
Norway also acquired ownership of the Spitsbergen Archipelago (known as Svalbard from 
1925). The period is marked as the beginning of a trend which resulted in polar imperialism. 
Blom identifies Rolf Thommessen as a person promoting the agenda of bringing East 
Greenland into the Norwegian sphere of interests,
54
 and Thommessen used his newspaper 
Tidens Tegn to put pressure on the Norwegian government as early as 1923–1924. This was in 
keeping with the policies promoted by a national lobby group working towards the goal of 
claiming East Greenland for Norway.
55
 Later, Rolf Thommessen regarded and used polar 
matters as a means to unify the conservatives on a policy of Norwegian expansion into East 
Greenland. This was part of a larger scheme intended to fight the perceived threat of 
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socialism.
56
 Rolf Thommessen was the man who helped Roald Amundsen organize his most 
spectacular expeditions. Did he use Amundsen to front his own agendas? 
It was not just the Norwegian government that may have seen Roald Amundsen as a resource 
to be used to further its own agenda. The Italian government, led by the Fascist dictator 
Benito Mussolini, used the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Expedition to further Fascist Italy. 
This is another area where Rolf Thommessen was influential, as he sympathized with Fascist 
ideals and goals, notably as the Carlylean strong man. 
As the expeditions became increasingly dependent on advanced and manpower-intensive 
technology, Amundsen became less and less of a critical factor to the completion of his 
expeditions. The introduction of the airplane and airship in exploration was in many ways the 
realization of a dream for explorers, as manual labour could be substituted with a flying 
machine. Roald Amundsen was among the first explorers to see a practical use for the 
airplane in exploring the Arctic, but he was not the first to attempt to use an airplane or airship 
to reach his goals. The airplane was a relative novelty when Roald Amundsen began the 
Maud expedition, but due to advances in mechanical engineering and aeronautics made during 
the First World War, new airplanes came at a rapid pace and records in both endurance and 
speed were frequently broken. 
 
Reflections on the sources in light of theory and method 
Ottar Dahl states in his Grunntrekk i historieforskningens metodelære that all sources can lie 
or be wrong, and that the truth can lie hidden in sources that are deemed less than credible.
57
 
Knut Kjelstadli states in his work Fortida er ikke hva den engang var that there is no way to 
absolutely determine if a source is credible or not; it is an art where one uses knowledge of 
time, place, environment and intuition to make a conscious decision.
58
 Ingar Kaldal states in 
Historisk forskning, forståing og forteljing that most historians write their accounts based on a 
mosaic of sources that are ”more or less” credible, and that it is unreasonable to demand that 
all sources should be undeniably reliable.
59
 The authors are adamant that one should, when 
available, use primary sources, primary meaning close in time, place and person. They are 
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equally adamant that one has to evaluate the source and make up one’s mind as to its 
credibility. Dahl gives rules and principles, Kjelstadli rules of thumb, and Kaldal offers 
advice. Whenever one works with sources, it comes down to the researcher’s judgement of 
reliability. Most of the material used here consists of articles, satire, accounts, unpublished 
material and literature. Some appear reliable, others appear less so and some may even be 
biased.  
Behan McCullagh writes in his article “Bias in Historical Description, Interpretation and 
Explanation” that there are four basic ways to become biased. First, one can misinterpret 
evidence. Second, an account may omit significant facts on the subject that makes it 
unbalanced. Third, a general description of the past can imply facts that are known to be false. 
Fourth, causal explanations can be used with the intent to somewhat mislead the reader.
60
 
McCullagh states that: “Biased descriptions are often unjust, presenting a one-sided 
impression of their subject that accords with the historian’s interest.”61 He writes that bias 
may be unavoidable in history, as historians use concepts to describe, select evidence to 
support, and use words to present their interest.
62
 McCullagh continues to state that those who 
look for support for their hypotheses, carefully and deliberately subject the outcome to critical 
evaluation.
63
 Personal bias can be overcome by committing to the standards of rational 
historical inquiry.
64
 Bias is deplorable, he states, and he continues by stating that historians 
have a “social responsibility to produce fair descriptions and explanations (...).”65 Ottar Dahl 
writes in his article “Bruk og misbruk av histore”66 that the main difference between use and 
abuse of history is motive.
67
 Dahl also states that the primary objective of a scientist is to find 
the truth,
68
 and that the values of writers of history are reflected in their choice of topic, 
subject, thesis and narration.
69
 Use or abuse of history, claims Dahl, is determined by vague 
and varying criteria. He states that use is argumentation to further a purpose, while abuse is 
flawed argumentation, often combined with a negative evaluation of the purpose or result.
70
 
The problem of abuse and bias does not decrease when one takes the basic understanding of 
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hermeneutics into account; that the sources influence the author just as much as the author 
uses the source to further his own understanding and account. In this case, a biased source can 
influence the author to become biased himself. McCullagh states that the way to be the least 
biased in a narrative appears to be to use several different narratives, debate them, see them 
from many perspectives and come to a conclusion.
71
 All mentioned markers for bias or abuse 
can in some way or another be held against the material used in the thesis, but it is still 
material that can be used with care and due reflection.  
I have used Leon Amundsen’s archive related to Roald Amundsen. Leon was Amundsen’s 
brother, and he was responsible for the administrative and economic parts of the Maud 
expedition until 1922. In 1922, Roald Amundsen began his cooperation with the Danish-
American Hakon H. Hammer, which lasted until 1924, when Amundsen dismissed Hammer 
for having committed fraud.
72
 
From 1924 to 1926, Rolf Thommessen of NLF was responsible for the economic and 
administrative parts of Roald Amundsen’s expeditions. Rolf Thommessen’s account became 
part of a litigation case against Roald Amundsen, claiming that Amundsen had breached his 
contract. As such, Thommessen’s account has to been viewed as anti-Amundsen, and 
coloured by his own agenda. At the same time, the account shows considerable insight into 
both the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight and the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar 
Flight, and this insight can be confirmed from other sources. It is a controversial source, as it 
has a lengthy internal logic, which Dahl states may be seen as a sign of an intelligently 
constructed lie,
73
 making the account less credible. And there are indeed signs that there is 
something not quite right with the account. There are indications that point to the account 
having been written with the agenda of proving that Roald Amundsen had broken his contract 
with NLF more than informing the court of Thommessen’s objective view. Some things are 
false and some things appear true in the account. It has been used as a source with the above-
mentioned facts in mind. Although one has to bear in mind the words of Dahl, there might be 
some truth in an unlikely source as well.  
Unpublished material from Norsk Luftseiladsforening’s archives has also been used. The NLF 
organized and administered the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight and the Amundsen-
Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight. The archive in itself is extensive, but weak. There are 
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few signed contracts. The contract issue is important to the understanding of the problems that 
arose after the expedition. As it is, there are piles of drafts for contracts, but very few signed 
ones. The more one investigates the issue, the more it becomes clear that finding the truth 
with regards to the contracts might be an impossible task. One has to make up one’s mind and 
decide what may have been probable. Statements of income are also rare. These are mostly 
found in correspondence with contracts attached, but this is mostly for international sources of 
income. Norwegian sources of income are missing. In the archive, there are no actual books 
that show income and expenses, and only one accountant report, which was very critical to 
how the NLF conducted its business. There are many sources that show estimates of possible 
income, some of which are speculative to the point of absurdity. As it is, the archive does 
have its use, as the correspondence found there gives the impression that there is more 
cooperation between the expeditions of Roald Amundsen and the Norwegian government than 
is immediately apparent in most literature. 
The last reflection is on people. Roald Amundsen, as a human, has been left out of the thesis, 
as he was and remains difficult to grasp in short statements and characteristics. When Roald 
Amundsen is mentioned, it is to denote his image, as a heroic figure and a national symbol. 
Rolf Thommessen is a particular problem as he, as a person, is universally condemned in 
modern literature as a traitor because of his sympathy and cooperation with Fascists in light of 
the Second World War. It is important to remember that in the contemporary world, he was 
both a respected and important member of society. He was the editor of one of the most 
popular and circulated newspapers in Norway, and his thoughts and ideas were considered 
outspoken, but not uncommon. His views and actions during the decade leading up to the 
Second World War are not included in this master thesis. 
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2 
The Maud Expedition(s) 
“And then “Maud” passes into the fairy tale, as the polar night slowly descends on the ship 
and its brave men. But the knowledge that the thoughts and hope of an entire people 
accompany them, will make the lonelyness and hardship easier to endure.”74 
 
The Maud expedition is the foundation on which this thesis bases its investigation of Roald 
Amunden’s expeditions. As such it needs to be defined, explained and placed in a historical 
context. Maud has been labeled as a single expedition and has been treated as such in the 
press and amongst historians. On closer inspection, such a view is misleading. The expedition 
lasted from 1918 to 1925, seven years, and during that time there were several changes to the 
expedition. There was a change of command as Roald Amundsen abandoned the expedition, 
leaving his second in command, Oscar Wisting, in charge. There was a change of crew on 
more than one occation, and the expedition was repeatedly abandoned and re-launched. As a 
result, the single expedition perspective benefits from being separated into different phases. In 
order to clarify the long and confusing expedition for myself, I have used a chronological 
order to the four various phases of the expedition. The journey through the Northeast Passage 
is Maud, phase A. The re-launch from Nome (Alaska) in August 1920 is Maud, phase B. The 
re-launch from Seattle in June 1922 is Maud, phase C. Finally there is the Maud Expedition 
Transarctic Flight, which was supposed to be an independent sub-unit of Maud, phase C.  
 
The Maud Expedition, phase A 
The first part of the Maud expedition, phase A, is the journey that eventually succeeded in 
traversing the Northeast Passage. Prior to the launch of the Maud expedition, Phase A, there 
was some interest in Amundsen and his new expedition in the media, notably Aftenposten. 
                                                          
74
 Not signed. ”Foran starten af Roald Amundsen Nordpolsekspedition. Mandskabet samlet. –”Maud” er snart 
seilklare. Fra et besøg ombord.” Aftenposten. Year 59. No. 308. Sunday, 23 June 1918. Author’s translation. 
22 
 
This newspaper devoted a full front page and several pages inside the paper to an extensive 
account of Roald Amundsen’s preparations for the expedition. Amundsen was described as an 
easy-going, lovable, quick and handsome person. He explained that everyone had been 
amiable towards him, and that there had been no trouble in getting the necessary equipment or 
seven years’ worth of food, despite the current rationing regime due to the First World War. 
He summed it all up rather optimistically, saying that his ship was a “tip top vessel”.75 
Amundsen was not alone in being interviewed before the launch. The director of the 
meteorological observatory in Bergen, Birkeland, was also interviewed.
76
 He was supposed to 
participate, but his position was dropped in favour of Harald Ulrik Sverdrup. Birkeland 
described some of the experiments and science that was to be conducted aboard Maud. The 
tone of this interview was businesslike, but Birkeland was described favourably.
77
 Another 
item of interest was a renewed focus on polar postcards. In an earlier attempt to launch a 
North Pole expedition, postcards had been printed and sold to be taken to the North Pole and 
back, as a collectors’ item. These had been preserved, and the rest of the prints were prior to 
the launch on sale in the newsdesks at Aftenposten, Morgenbladet, Morgenposten and Tidens 
Tegn. These newspapers appeared to be interested in selling the postcards to support the Maud 
expedition.
78
 Maud had been made into a floating post-office, and one hoped that it would 
turn out to be the northernmost in the world of its kind.
79
 The last big interview was a three-
page affair in Aftenposten, starting on the front page. Here Amundsen, the crew, the supplies 
and the ship were praised as the finest that Norway had to offer – the sum of Norwegian 
shipping traditions, all worthy of their task. The cost of the expedition was one million kroner. 
One tenth came from private donors, while two tenths, NOK 200,000, had been awarded by 
the Storting in 1917. These funds were awarded with an overwhelming majority, as only eight 
members of the Storting voted against.
80
 The rest came from Amundsen himself. Aftenposten 
was especially interested in the supplies. They made a point of how there was no rationing 
aboard Maud. Special treats such as tobacco and chocolate had been donated by Norwegian 
manufacturers. There was also alchohol aboard, which was prohibited in Norway at the time, 
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and Amundsen emphazised how there would be no prohibition aboard. Amundsen even hinted 
to his faith in flying, and the new way of exploring, when he claimed that Maud was supposed 
to bring along airplanes and flying kites, but that these had had to be left behind due to lack of 
space.
81
 Aftenposten was the newspaper that had the most interest in Roald Amundesen’s 
launch. Dagbladet, on the other hand, did not bother to make his departure front page news, 
and reserved their interviews for page 3.
82
 Both papers stated that the scientific study of the 
air and seas in the Arctic was the primary concern and that the Pole merely was a secondary 
goal, but “Amundsen will probably not let the pole drift by withouth planting the Norwegian 
flag on it.”83 
Maud left Kristiania on 25 June 1918. The departure was kept secret, and only a handful of 
relatives were present to wave their goodbyes. A few soldiers from the Royal Guard happened 
to pass by and waved enthusiastically and cheered. None had been told, not even the press, 
which had been left in the dark.
84
 There were considerably more festivities as Maud sailed 
along the Norwegian coast. At Stoksund, salutes were fired, flags were raised, and people 
hailed the ship.
85
 Similar reports from along the coast tell the same story. People seemed 
proud of a new expedition that would cause glory for Norway. As Maud left Vardø
86
 and 
Norway on 18 June 1918, people did not expect to hear anything from the expedition for years 
to come, as it sailed through distant waters.  
Aftenposten was very positive towards the Amundsen expedition during this pre-phase. News 
and descriptions had a positive, even benign tone. Even the comic press was positive. The 
magazine Karikaturen included the expedition in a song, describing the members as brave and 
handsome, and the expedition as a means to get a legal drink.
87
 Its competitor, Hvepsen, was 
equally enthusiastic, including in a song a verse dedicated to praising the expedition and 
Amundsen. They wrote of a man who sought new harbours, leaving civilization and summer 
in favour of winter and the Pole. Amundsen was hailed as a brave man, and his ship, named 
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after the Norwegian queen, was described as a treasure throve of food and drink, sailing under 
the Norwegian flag; they sought to serve their motherland.
88
 But everybody did not think that 
the patriotism was well-placed. In Hvepsen, Amundsen’s expedition was also condemned as 
“Norwegian imperialism”, and it was claimed that as Norway had recently become a member 
of the League of Nations, it apparently also had to “conquer what can be conquered”, and that 
Norway was pursuing this course of action in order to be “mentioned as a world power”.89 
This was a fairly accurate judgement of what was about to happen in Norwegian foreign 
policy. The Maud expedition’s launch in 1918 coincided with the end of a Norwegian foreign 
policy that had focused on working quietly in the wings in order to probe the feasibility of 
Norway making a claim in the Artic, a silent diplomatic agenda which had begun in 1908.
90
 
The claim was propelled by the numerous Norwegian private citizens who had interests in the 
area and who made it painfully clear that Norway also needed a policy on the Arctic in 
general and Spitsbergen in particular, if it was to make good on its claim for these areas to be 
controlled by Norway.
91
 
After the initial news interest and well-wishes, Maud was not mentioned anywhere until 1919, 
when one article on the Maud expedition was printed. It was a front-page report from a 
stopover at a Russian radio outpost at Dickson Island.
92
 That was the first and last news from 
the expedition as it was en route, and the author had a positive outlook. It ended with praise of 
Amundsen as an experienced sailor who knew most of the Arctic, and would lead the 
expedition to a happy conclusion.
93
 
The Norwegian government took political steps to acquire Spitsbergen, and so 1919 marks the 
introduction of a new type of Norwegian foreign policy, the expansion into the Arctic.
94
 
Roald Berg states that there was a wish in Norway to expand into territory that was viewed as 
Terra Nullus, or no man’s land.95 Before 1919, the Norwegian policy had been to secure the 
country’s economic interests on Spitsbergen, but the work to acquire the archipelago came to 
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a halt due to the First World War.
96
 After the war, the Norwegian government became 
actively involved in the work to claim Spitsbergen, and a treaty giving Norway superiority 
over the Archipelago was signed in 1920.
97
 
During 1919, Godfred Hansen, a Danish naval captain, led an expedition to Thule, Greenland 
to build a depot for the Maud expedition, as it was expected to arrive near Greenland after 
following the ocean currents over the North Pole.
98
 The depot was set up in order to make 
sure that the expedition had sufficient supplies to be able to complete the journey back to 
Norway. The Storting granted funds, unanimously and without debate, for the expedition, 
which was proposed by Knud Rasmussen and led by Godfred Hansen. Leon Amundsen, 
Roald Amundsen’s brother, wrote a narrative on this matter in a letter, detailing where the 
depots were located.
99
 
The first news that came directly from the Maud expedition was a telegram that arrived in 
Kristiania on the morning of 7 April 1920.
100
 At this stage, interest in the expedition seemed 
to have cooled, as the news from the expedition did not make the front page. It was treated as 
any other article. In the telegram, Amundsen asked what route Peter L. Tessem and Paul 
Knutsen had taken back to the civilized world after they had left Maud. They left the 
expedition to deliver mail, it was a chance for Amundsen to send home Tessem and Knutsen 
was sent with him as a companion.
101
  
Aftenposten mistakenly reported that the men had left the ship in 1918, during the first 
winter.
102
 In fact, they had left in early autumn the following year, on 4 September 1919.
103
 It 
was now 1920, and no one had known that Tessem and Knutsen had left Maud, and even less 
was known of their status or position. The telegram was the beginning of a mystery that still 
lingers; what happened to Tessem and Knutsen? Two rescue operations were launched to look 
for them. Neither expedition had any hope of finding them alive, but the goal was to discover 
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their fate. The first expedition, the Begitchev expedition, found the burned remains of a 
human, along with shell casings of Norwegian origin. The shells were issued by the 
Norwegian army, from which Amundsen himself had borrowed all the weapons and 
ammunition for the expedition.
104
 The expedition concluded that one of the participants 
burned the remains of the other in order to keep wild animals away. The ashes from the 
fireplace were buried.
105
 The second expedition, the Urvantzeff expedition, found the remains 
of the second member. His remains were found within sight of the radio outpost at Dickson 
Island. The expedition concluded, by investigating the origins of a gold watch and a wedding 
ring, that the person was Tessem. The expedition then speculated that he had slipped, been 
knocked unconscious and had died of exposure to the extreme weather. The speculation was 
based on what they found around the remains of the body.
106
 Based on the findings of the 
Urvantzeff expedition, it seems probable that the burned human remains found by the 
Begitchev expedition was Knutsen, and that the body found near the Dickson Island radio 
station was Tessem. The newspaper stories written on these two unfortunate members of the 
Maud expedition did not commit to any finger-pointing, as it seems that both history and the 
press thinks it all was the result of bad luck. 
As the news of the Tessem and Knutsen disappearance surfaced, articles in the press were 
soon drawn and focused on the fact that the Maud expedition, phase A was on its way to 
Nome, not the North Pole. A telegram arrived in Kristiania, stating that Amundsen would be 
in Nome in June 1920. This was met with puzzlement. Speculation on why the expedition was 
returning to civilization rather than staying in isolation ran rife. Did they need more crew? 
Did they need more food? Did they need more fuel? Or send mail? Everyone who had 
anything to do with polar matters were called in and asked questions. Amundsen’s choices 
were compared to his stunt in 1910, when he turned his North Pole drift into a race for the 
South Pole.
107
 Was this something similar, a stunt to conquer the Northeast Passage? 
Aftenposten kept a positive spin on the Northeast Passage story and chose to focus on the 
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honour gained for Norway, viewing this as another page in the book of Norwegian polar 
deeds. But as there was no further news from the Maud expedition, speculation continued. 
Polar experts were regularly being asked what they thought of the cryptic telegram from 
Maud. Norwegian experts were not keen on commenting,
 108
 so Aftenposten went abroad and 
sought out more talkative experts elsewhere in Scandinavia. They commented that Amundsen 
might have to abandon his expedition and re-launch it from Nome.
109
 Aftenposten then 
received news that the expedition was dissolving, and that Amundsen planned to abandon the 
expedition. This was denied by Leon Amundsen.
110
 Dagbladet also printed a similar story, 
and this too was denied by Leon Amundsen.
111
 
In Aftenposten, Roald Amundsen’s “official” account was printed with an abridged 
description of what had happened during the expedition, up to the present. The paper’s 
following shift in attitude was phenomenal. Gone was all doubt and hearsay. It turned 
patriotic and romantic, almost naïve, in the description of the Maud expedition in general and 
Amundsen in particular. On the prospect of sailing into the ice for another five years, 
Aftenposten wrote the following: “A holy fire burns in the man, and in the men who of their 
own free will follow him, and who know perfectly well what they have ahead of them 
(…).”112 and continued by stating that: “His and his men’s honour is the nation’s honour.”113 
The fact that two crewmembers had left the expedition in order to deliver mail and then 
disappeared was not mentioned. Some might have been disapproving the lack of consideration 
for Tessem and Knutsen and some may have questioned that the expedition had come to 
America instead of the North Pole, but such views were not printed nor recognized.
114
 The 
official story, written by Amundsen and the other contributors to the book Nordostpassasjen 
(Northeast Passage), painted a picture of an expedition that had bad luck, but which was 
united. Tor Bomann-Larsen, on the other hand, has a more detailed account of the mental 
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state of Amundsen and his crew. It was not a happy ship.
115
 Alexander Wisting attribute this 
unhappiness and in a way the failure of the expedition to vitamin A poisoning due to all the 
bear meat they ate during the expedition, which allegedly explains the symptoms of illness, 
depression and aggression that the crew suffered from.
116
 The definite truth remains unkown. 
In Norway, the positive aspects of what happened during the expedition became published in 
the book Nordostpassagen (The Northeast Passage). In line with Roald Amundsen’s way of 
writing, it was a happy account on the highlights of the expedition, downplaying the hardships 
and emphasizing their achievements. The income from this book benefited neither the 
expedition nor Roald Amundsen himself, but was made out to his family.
 117
 
Maud, phase A was popular in the press. Although there is no proof that Aftenposten or other 
newspapers purchased news from Leon or Roald Amundsen, Aftenposten was predominantly 
positive. When Maud reached Nome, a majority of the crew abandoned the expedition.
118
 Not 
all the crewmembers that left Maud were treated fairly. As they left the ship, some had to fend 
for themselves. The only work to be found in Nome was in the local gold mines, and they had 
to work there until they could pay the boat fare back to Norway themselves. One member of 
the expedition had to sell his clothing to afford the ticket home. When these members of the 
expedition came back to Norway, Roald Amundsen’s brother, Leon was there to meet them. 
He debriefed the expedition members before they talked to the press. In the press they have 
nothing but good to say on Amundsen.
119
 When one member of the expedition did go to the 
media, it was two years later, and then he told the story of Nome and the gold digging 
industry. That the crewmembers had been working in the mines remained a secret.
120
 This fact 
might have been kept secret in order to make sure the public image of Roald Amundsen 
remained untarnished. Tor Bomann-Larsen claims that the members who left the expedition 
were, in Amundsen’s view, “traitors” who should be sent home and forgotten.121 The Maud 
crew returned home, and there was no public scandal on their treatment, as both the 
expedition participants and the media apparently were interested in retaining cordial terms 
with Amundsen. 
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The comic press were both supportive and critical towards the Maud expedition. The comic 
press magazine Exlex did “report” that the pole was reached in 1919, with a caricature that has 
become a symbol of the polar nation of Norway. 
The drawing, by Ragnvald Blix, was 
titled Magtens Fordeling (The 
Distribution of Power), and states that 
“England can keep their world 
supremacy at sea, Norway has one in the 
ice”.122 When Maud reached America, 
the comic press was quick to point out 
that they considered it a scam that Leon 
Amundsen sold “old news” to the media 
in Kristiania. America had already been 
discovered.
 123
 Later the magazine 
claimed in a song on Otto Sverdrup that 
“Roald” could have spared himself this 
polar trip, as there was debate on 
whether he would ever reach the Pole, or 
if he would “do as Nansen did” and come home with empty pockets.124  
Despite the attacks made by the comic press, the media coverage had a mostly positive angle 
on Amundsen and Maud, Phase A. There was, however, a peculiar difference between 
Aftenposten and Dagbladet’s coverage when it was feared that the expedition was dissolving 
and that Amundsen was possibly on his way home in shame. Aftenposten asked a question 
while Dagbladet made a statement. When definite and signed news arrived, the patriotism 
was overwhelming. The comic press did criticize Amundsen on topics that were absent in the 
press, such as his inability to reach the Pole and deliver the promised results. The newspapers 
were enthusiastic, and there was some criticism from Hvepsen. 
Aboard the Maud expedition, phase A was Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, the expedition’s chief 
scientist. During the voyage through the Northeast Passage, he and the crew of Maud 
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conducted experiments on earth-magnetism, atmospheric-electricity, weather conditions on 
the surface and in the air, oceanographic conditions and whatever else that “may have been of 
interest.”125 Sverdrup also conducted ethnographic studies on the local population.126 In 
essence, his work was done in a scientific fashion, with a scientific mind and with research 
and increased knowledge as his motivation. Harald Dag Jølle writes extensively on the 
ethnographic studies of Harald Sverdrup, who travelled with Arctic Intuits in order to study 
them as a scientist.
127
 When it was processed years later, his work was considered 
important.
128
 Sverdrup and his work was the most successful aspect of this expedition phase, 
and relate the Maud expedition to science. 
The Maud Expedition, phase B 
While the newspapers in Norway reported hearsay on what Amundsen might or might not 
have done and praised him, news arrived stating that Amundsen had left Nome on 8 August 
1920 for the unknown, expecting to return to civilization five years later.
 129
 That was the first 
news from and the beginning of the Maud expedition, phase B. Aftenposten appears to have 
expected news from the expedition, but apparently not that Amundsen was leaving Alaska for 
the Pole so soon. It was only after he had left Nome that news on what happened surfaced. 
Aftenposten reported that most of the crew had left the expedition, apart from Oscar Wisting, 
Harald Ulrik Sveredrup and Gennady Olonkin. Aftenposten claimed that “(…) there is no 
reason to believe that Amundsen, among the thousands of Norwegian and Swedish men in 
Nome, has not found those people he needs to accomplish his coming task.”130 Amundsen left 
with a mostly Inuit crew, apart from those who had not left the ship. In November 1920, 
Amundsen wrote to the media of his new Inuit crew. He claims that he hired them because the 
other applicants were too expensive, as they wanted three hundred dollars a month, and were 
“incompetent”. An Inuit crew were cheaper. One of them, Mary, he claimed to be clean, a 
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good cook and an excellent seamstress.
131
 The news that a woman was aboard prompted 
Hvepsen to print a caricature of Amundsen as an alcoholised womanizer.  
What concerned the paper was that Amundsen had not 
waited for the mail, goods, food and papers he had 
ordered from Norway, but left Nome for the Arctic before 
any goods had arrived. The newspaper staff waited until 
some of the crew that left the expedition returned to 
Norway before they made inquiries into what was 
happening to the expedition. Amundsen, on the other 
hand, was on his way north. On 27 August 1920, the 
expedition reached Cape Serge, where they had to make 
camp due to unfavourable ice conditions. At 6 September, news arrived in Norway that Maud 
was actually locked in the ice.
132
 In Aftenposten, speculation flourished on whether Amundsen 
would have to abort his expedition or not.
133
 Amundsen managed to send word with a passing 
ship that Maud was stranded in the pack-ice and that the ship had survived ice pressing.
134
 
Maud spent the winter at Cape Serdtse-Kamen,
135
 located at 76° north. Dagbladet summed up 
all these news in June 1921.
136
 Maud managed to get out of the ice, and with damaged 
propellers the expedition was able to limp back to port. In June 1921 Amundsen was back in 
Nome, and the Maud was towed to Seattle in August 1921. The expedition needed to be 
properly refurbished, as the ship was worn by the ice and the propellers had to be replaced. 
Amundsen sent a telegram to the Norwegian Storting asking for NOK 300,000 to fund the 
refitting of Maud and continue the voyage to the North Pole. As Aftenposten writes, the fate 
of the Maud expedition was in the hands of the Storting. They were to decide whether the 
Maud expedition would be abandoned or continue as a Norwegian expedition.
137
 The 
Norwegian Storting did indeed want to keep the Maud expedition in the sphere of Norwegian 
affairs. It had already, behind closed doors, proposed to set aside NOK 500,000 for the 
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continuation of the expedition, which was NOK 200,000 more than Amundsen asked for. The 
Storting informed the public that they made the decision behind closed doors in order to give 
Amundsen “free reigns” and make sure that his hands were not bound by the wishes of the 
Storting,
138
 where the funding had been approved by a unanimous vote.
139
 Aftenposten voiced 
disappointment towards the fact that the expedition had been abandoned, but made sure that 
there was a positive twist on the material they printed. Both Dagbladet and the comic press 
presented contrasting views. Dagbladet raised criticism towards the expedition on the grounds 
that it had failed yet again, and appears to have been provoked by the Storting’s approval of 
funding Amundsen with NOK 500,000 behind closed doors.
140
 In the 1920’s, Norway was 
beset by economic hardships, and this was seen as frivolous spending. Amundsen and his 
brother had not been informed in advance of the government’s generous offer. The funds were 
donated on 16 July 1921.
141
 These funds were mainly used to cover the refit of Maud and to 
bring some crewmembers back to Norway after they left the 
expedition. The comic press magazine Karikaturen claimed that 
Amundsen should be made Minister of finance for his deeds, 
with reference to his apparent skill of acquiring money.
142
 
Another caricature in Karikaturen shows Amundsen robbing 
Prime Minister Otto Bahr Halvorsen.
143
 Karikaturen stated flatly 
that Amundsen found it difficult to find the North Pole, as the 
first time he went looking he found the South Pole, and the 
second time he found Alaska. So what would be next?
144
 
Roald Berg states that 1920 was the year when the Norwegian “wave” of Arctic expansion 
truly began. Until then, expansion had been confined to the acquisition of Spitsbergen, which 
was well underway.
145
 Norway acquired limited control over Spitsbergen in 1920. It appears 
that a new goal was set as popular demand wanted the cabinet to look into the prospect of 
acquiring East-Greenland as well. Between 1921 and 1924, the Storting involved itself in this 
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debate.
146
 Berg view the Storting's interest as a passing fancy, and that the goal of the cabinet 
was to focus on the new acquisition of Spitsbergen and the cabinets desire to consolidate, 
rather than the stortings wish to expand.
147
  
The funds from the Norwegian government were transferred directly to Amundsen’s brother 
Leon.
148
 Roald Amundsen left the Maud expedition in 1921, in an attempt to find a new way 
of making sure that the expedition reached the North Pole. In Seattle, Maud was refitted 
during the autumn of 1921 and into the new year of 1922, in preparation for Maud, Phase C. 
The Maud Expedition, phase C 
Amundsen left Maud to seek glory by other means, specifically by airplane, but he used Maud 
and the expedition as a transport vessel from Seattle to Nome. Amundsen was no longer 
Maud’s captain, as Oscar Wisting had replaced him.149 Other new crew members included a 
new engine chief, Syvertsen, a new first mate, Hansen and the Siberian Chukchi Kakhot.
150
 It 
was expected that Maud, phase C would be in the ice for five to seven years while they drifted 
across the North Pole and conducted scientific experiments. Gone was the scepticism that had 
been voiced when Maud, phase A and phase B had failed to achieve the goals set out. The 
media coverage was once again patriotic and hopeful.
 151
 The restored Maud was equipped 
with a modern radio so they could hear what the world was saying and send messages of their 
own. This allowed for real-time communication with the outside world, which had not been 
possible previously. It also allowed for the expedition to have a new source of income, selling 
news from the expedition. Leon Amundsen had sold the news of the Maud expedition to four 
newspapers: Aftenposten, Morgenbladet, Morgenposten, and Tidens Tegn. The four papers 
would each quarter during Maud’s drift pay NOK 1,000 to receive exclusive news from the 
expedition.
152
 This showed that there was an interest in spending money on buying news from 
an Arctic expedition. The contracts, which were made public by the papers as boasts, were 
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thoroughly criticized by Karikaturen, who claimed that the newspapers in the capital had 
bought Roald Amundsen with:  
 (…) skin and bone and fountain pen. Everything he says and writes and thinks and dreams has been 
 sold in advance (…) for a set amount for each word. So when one of these papers doesn’t have 
 anything to write, they just phone brother Leon and order a few meters of Roald.
153
  
 
Karikaturen claimed that this was a very practical 
arrangement, except for one thing: “Why is Roald writing up 
there in the ice? Would it not be cheaper and more 
convenient for all if he sat at Svartskog?”154 The criticism of 
Roald Amundsen shows that there was awareness in the 
community of what was happening. Amundsen was in the 
tentative beginning of the cooperation between explorer and 
media, and people knew. 
The Maud expedition also carried a scouting airplane, which according to Kåre Berg was the 
first airplane used for such a purpose in the Arctic.
155
 This was a sensational addition to the 
expedition. Odd Dahl had been hired as pilot and in an interview, Dahl said that he was 
forbidden to talk about the expedition. But he was allowed to speak of flying in general terms. 
Dahl spoke of the relative ease of working in cold conditions, and claimed that ice and pack 
ice would no be more than a nuisance. He was more worried of engine failure, which he 
claimed to be relatively common.
156
 Dahl was to realise that the polar ice was not an ideal 
area for airplanes, as a radio report from Maud confirms:  
 “(…) in the area we work, there is not a single natural landing strip which is 100 meters long, so an 
 emergency landing is out of the question.”157 A later attempt to fly in the Arctic left the airplane in ruins 
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 while both the pilot Dahl and the observer Wisting managed to leave the crash site unharmed. “(…) so 
 the plans for a geographic study of from an airplane had to be abandoned.”158 
Sverdrup and a new addition, the Swedish meteorologist Finn Malmgren, was to continue the 
scientific work, and were able to set up a floating geophysical laboratory in the ice,
159
 where 
they and the crew of Maud could study the Arctic while they drifted with the ice, hopefully to 
the North Pole.  
The Maud expedition, phase C set off from Seattle on 4 June 1922, in the shadow of a local 
media frenzy over Amundsen’s proposed plans to fly to the North Pole in the Maud 
Expedition Transarctic Flight (see below). The plan was for Maud to sail into the ice, now 
with a new and motivated crew. The goal was the same as always, to reach the North Pole. 
Maud, phase C left the Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight, consisting of Amundsen and his 
pilots, in Nome, and continued into the ice.
160
 In the autumn of 1922, Maud froze into the ice 
near Wrangel Island, and began the drift. The news from Maud, phase C were sent by radio. 
In December 1922 they broadcast both their position and their drift pattern.
161
 During the 
winter, they drifted further north and reported that they found virtually no wildlife and 
expected to loose radio reception when the light season began.
162
 On 10 June 1923, the 
engineer aboard Maud died.
163
 The ship reached 75 degrees north by Christmas.
164
. In 
February 1924, it was reported that the ship drifted west rather than north, and concerns were 
voiced that the ship might collide with one of the islands in the Severnaja Zemlja 
archipelago.
165
 At that time, Roald Amundsen was insolvent, and due to his bankruptcy, he 
could no longer afford the expedition. He sent a message to Maud and had them abort their 
polar drift. It was too late in the season for the expedition to attempt a breakout from the ice, 
so they had to stay another winter, into 1925, and then return to Seattle. When they arrived, 
the ship was confiscated by the local authorities in order to pay Amundsen’s American 
creditors, and the crew was shipped home. ”A bare half-dozen persons were at the dock to 
welcome the Maud, contrasting sharply to the 5,000 who bade the vessel and captain 
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Amundsen good luck a little more than three years ago.”166 In Norway, the crew were given a 
modest welcome. The Maud, phase C expedition had ended, although Sverdrup continued to 
process and publish the data collected, which gained international repute and fame. The saga 
from 1918 to 1925 was over. The goal of the expedition had not been reached, but the 
research done aboard made it famous. 
According to Narve Fulsås, the expedition was a failure, as it did not manage to drift over the 
Pole, but it was a scientific success due to Sverdrup and his work.
167
 Sverdrup published his 
preliminary findings in The Scientific Montly in May 1926.
168
 Robert Marc Friedman writes 
that the material gathered during the Maud expedition was enormous and took years to 
process.
169
 Furthermore, a sensational expedition acquired interest from the press, and a 
scientific expedition did not. He sees sensation and science as increasingly mutually 
exclusive, one could not have both.
170
  
So why did the government invest so much money in the expedition? The Norwegian 
government had sponsored previous expeditions with an explicit goal of creating publicity, 
namely Fridtjof Nansen’s Fram I expedition. Narve Fulsås writes that part of the government 
support for the expedition of Fridtjof Nansen was due to the amount of enthusiasm it was 
expected that his expedition would create at its supposed triumphal return. What was good for 
Nansen was good for Norway. That his expedition failed was of no consequence, it created 
prestige for Norway.
171
 The issue of polar politics was not on a party political level, it was on 
a national level. Fulsås writes that the “polar enthusiasm” of Nansen was difficult to place 
along political conflict lines, so it was non-political and much more valuable than a party 
victory.
172
 There are comparable factors between Fram and Maud, as Maud was also 
considered non-political, which Fulsås sees as a sign that science was an acceptable way to 
spend government money.
173
 However, the possible intent that the Norwegian government 
may have had did not lead to anything positive as Maud was a failed polar drift expedition. It 
did not amount to anything definite in the way of planting the Norwegian flag. When the 
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Storting funded the Maud expedition, there may have been a hope that it would return in 
triumph, as Nansen once had done, but the expedition did not help the Norwegian government 
with instant international sensation, more likely the inverse.  
The Maud expedition, phase C received predominantly positive coverage. The criticism that 
had been present at earlier phases was directed at Roald Amundsen personally. The coverage 
of the expedition did suffer from three facts. First, it was only partially in communication due 
to atmospheric disturbances and the sheer distance, as the ship was on the other side of the 
world from Norway. Second, the expedition came increasingly into the shadow of 
Amundsen’s other projects. Last, the media lost interest in the expedition due to a lack of 
sensation, even something as basic as progress was absent and eventually the expedition was 
rarely mentioned.  
The media supported the expedition with about NOK 14,000 while the Norwegian 
government spent NOK 700,000. The difference between the figures show that the Maud 
expedition was more of a government sponsored, scientific expedition with ambitions to reach 
the North Pole, than a sensational, media-funded expedition. The Maud expedition was 
intended to reaffirm Norway’s intentions in the Arctic and to make it plain that Norway was a 
serious polar nation. The Maud, phase C segment was the most scientific of the expedition’s 
phases, and the data collected took years to process and publish. The Norwegian Storting had 
no discussion on the subject of Maud’s importance, but the level of funding shows that it had 
considerable importance for the Storting, and the lack of discussion can also be seen as a 
positive, as the vote was unanimous. There was a tradition on supporting polar expeditions, 
and as the i, phase C expedition as a whole was given NOK 500,000 by the Norwegian 
Storting without any debate, it seems apparent that the expedition was the object of 
considerable interest in the Norwegian government, but that they would not speak their mind 
for fear of tying Roald Amundsen down. One can say that the scientific Maud expedition held 
considerable interest for the Norwegian government, and that it was willing to support the 
expedition to its conclusion. A consequence of the political involvement in the expedition was 
that Roald Amundsen was unable to use Maud as he saw fit, as there were strings attached, 
despite the government’s effort not to add any.  
Maud can be seen as a continuation of a tradition to invest in polar affairs for two main 
reasons. First, prestige as the government can bask in the glory of the expedition’s return. 
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Second, that the expedition gathered material useful in legitimizing the expansion into the 
Arctic, as Norway increased its knowledge and defined the unknown in a Norwegian context.  
It is in this area that the expedition gives continuity to the concept of Norway the polar nation. 
The Maud expedition did not only have the intention of allowing Roald Amundsen to make an 
attempt at the North Pole, that goal was secondary. The primary focus of the expedition was 
to gather scientific data needed to understand the Arctic, a geographic area firmly in the 
Norwegian sphere of interest.  
 
The Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight174 
While Maud was being refurbished in Seattle, Amundsen wrote a public letter, stating that he 
wanted to return to Norway, but that he and his loyal crew would only do so by way of the 
North Pole.
175
 News then surfaced that Amundsen was planning an expedition to the North 
Pole by airplane, and that he had left the Maud expedition. Amundsen was about to exchange 
ship for airplane and lead what has since been called the Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight, 
and leave Maud in the hands of Oscar Wisting and Harald Sverdrup.
 176
 Bomann-Larsen 
writes that the expedition had to seem to be a part of the Maud expedition, as it had received 
NOK 700,000 from the Norwegian government to complete the polar drift.
177
  
This expedition was the beginning of a union of expedition and explorer. As mentioned 
earlier, both Baldasty and Riffernburgh claim that news from the expeditions became 
something to market, and during this expedition, the newspapers that bought news from the 
expedition were predominantly more positive than other news sources. Leon Amundsen had 
sold the news rights for the Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight to Aftenposten, Tidens Tegn, 
Morgenbladet and Morgenposten for NOK 12,000 in 1922.
178
 In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, a supplement was added to the contract that stipulated that the four papers mentioned 
would pay NOK 1,000 each quarter in exchange for news from Maud, phase C.
179
 Roald Berg 
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writes in Norsk Polarhistorie that Amundsen “kept his cards close to his chest”,180 which was 
only natural considering that his words, his actions and the results were already sold to the 
media. It was readily accepted by Aftenposten that there was a change of plans and that the 
game had changed. One day, Aftenposten wrote on Amundsen’s hardship with Maud in the 
ice in an article titled “Three years of struggle against impenetrable ice-masses”181 where 
Amundsen was at the front of his loyal crew aboard Maud, wowing to only return across the 
Pole. Little more than a week later, Aftenposten proclaimed “The race to the North Pole!”182 
Hvepsen, which was not a part of the buying press, did voice their opinion that Amundsen had 
forgotten his promise of only arriving home after crossing the North Pole, and that the 
government bought him whatever he wished for.
183
 From this point onwards, Hvepsen became 
increasingly sceptical to Amundsen and his actions.  
In order to raise further funds for the flight, Leon Amundsen made several attempts to contact 
publishers who might be willing to make a book of his brother’s expedition and the events 
following The Northeast Passage. He also wanted to include an English-language version of 
the latter book. One such publisher Leon was in contact with was the MacMillan Publishers of 
New York. The publisher claimed that Amundsen’s book The Northeast Passage was not 
something they would undertake in America, due to “(…) the present state of the public and 
their reading sympathies (…)”.184 The MacMillan company was interested in publishing an 
account of Amundsen’s Maud Expeditions Transarctic flight to the North Pole if it was 
successful, and his brother Leon was adamant that any advance had to be as high as possible 
due to the “(…) heavy costs (…).”185 The company replied that they could not give an 
advance until they had a manuscript to look at to help them determine the audience and how 
much the book was worth.
186
 In due course, nothing came of the contact with MacMillan, as it 
failed to do with other publishers as well. The Northeast Passage was not printed in English. 
There was no interest in such material at the time.  
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In a letter to the Norwegian people, given to Leon Amundsen who later gave it to the media, 
Roald Amundsen explained his actions. It was his intention to include small airplanes on 
Maud and use them to explore the Arctic, but it had become necessary to expand his plans for 
the Maud expedition and include an airplane that was independent of Maud to scout a path for 
the ship to the North Pole and then land the airplane at Maud’s depot in East Greenland, and 
rendezvous with the main expedition. Amundsen had chosen to buy a Larsen airplane, which 
held the current endurance record of 26 hours, and had hired the best pilot in Norway, Oscar 
Omdal.
187
  
In cooperation with his business partner, Hakon H. Hammer, Amundsen bought airplanes 
from John M. Larsen, a Danish-American who made airplanes in the USA.
188
 Larsen 
considered himself a “Viking” and wanted to support Amundsen and the Maud Expedition 
Transarctic Flight. Larsen therefore sponsored the business transaction and wanted only 
minimal payment for the airplanes. In a business deal worth USD 80,000, Larsen donated 
about USD 60,000 worth of airplanes and equipment, reducing the amount Amundsen and 
Hammer had to pay to USD 20,000.
189
 One airplane was named Kristine (Curtis machine) and 
the other Elizabeth (JL-6 Larsen machine/Junkers Monoplane). Both were named after 
Amundsen’s current mistress Kristine Elisabeth Bennet.190 In order to give the pilot Omdal 
some experience in flying Elizabeth (I), it was decided that the aircraft should be flown to 
Seattle.
191
 On his flight with Elizabeth (I) from New York to the West Coast, the Larsen 
aircraft was forced down onto a field and ended up upside down with a broken wing. 
Amundsen returned to New York and found a replacement airplane, also a JL-6 
Larsen/Junkers monoplane, which he also named Elizabeth.
192
 This airplane is referred to as 
Elizabeth (II). The aircraft was now shipped by train to Seattle, where it was loaded aboard 
Maud along with the Curtis machine. 
Maud, phase C was under the command of Wisting and carried the airplanes and the flight 
crew aboard to Nome. When Maud left Nome, Amundsen and his crew set off for Point 
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Barrow on a borrowed Swedish-owned ship, C.P. Homes. Ice kept the expedition from 
reaching Point Barrow, and they set up their base at a log cabin called Maudheim, in 
Wainwright. From there, Amundsen established the base he was going to launch the Maud 
Expedition Transarctic Flight from. In Norway, the expedition was followed with intense 
interest. In June 1922, Aftenposten had a large front page article on Amundsen where his 
previous actions were glorified and his new plans said to be “(…) high-flying and more than 
daring (…)”193 The media collected opinions from both meteorologists and other pilots, and 
asked them of their opinion on Amundsen’s prospects. One pilot, Amundsen’s future right-
hand man Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, went far in claiming that the planned expedition would not 
be difficult, and when asked of the prospect of flying 15 hours continuously, he claimed “(…) 
it would be more straining to drive a car for 15 hours.”194 Dagbladet, which was cut out of the 
news flow, reported that it was “make or break” for Roald Amundsen’s expedition, citing a 
Danish flier who stated that the attempt was risky.
195
 Hvepsen also commented and 
proclaimed Amundsen as the conqueror of the North Pole, and even if he crashed, he would 
ride home on a polar bear, “(...) where others die as mosquitoes, he would find a way.”196 At 
the end of June, Aftenposten reported that Amundsen would probably fly to Spitsbergen 
instead of Cape Columbia on East Greenland, as Amundsen had sent a man to Spitsbergen to 
prepare a landing strip. Aftenposten duly reported that they expected Amundsen in Oslo 
within three weeks.
197
 At the beginning of July 1922, it was reported that Amundsen was still 
in Nome. Not long after, there came a message stating that Amundsen was postponing his 
planned flight until June 1923, as it was too late in the season to be able to make the flight.
198
 
Rumours made the newspapers print stories claiming that Amundsen had changed his mind 
and was about to fly.
199
 Even if Amundsen had cancelled the flight for that year, he was still 
reported as trying a flight in late August.
200
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During the winter of 1922–1923, Amundsen sent some long letters regarding the voyage with 
the C.P. Holmes to Wainwright, the unloading of the airplane Elizabeth (II)
201
 and some of 
how he and Omdal lived during the winter.
202
 When spring finally arrived, it was time to test 
the aircraft Elizabeth (II), which had been assembled during the wait. Amundsen and Omdal 
made a test flight on 11 May 1923. It indicated that the airplane was in bad shape. During 
landing the landing gear and skis broke, and the airplane crashed, destroying it completely, 
but Omdal was unharmed. Tor Bomann-Larsen writes that it should be considered a feat that a 
boxed airplane, which after an Arctic winter had been assembled on site, without the help of a 
professional workshop, was capable of flying at all.
203
 In Aftenposten, Omdal claimed that the 
engine was old and faulty, and that the landing gear was poorly designed, causing it to break 
during landing.
204
 The newspapers appear to agree and reported that Amundsen had received 
poor gear and a faulty engine.
205
 In a letter from John Larsen (the aircraft factory owner), he 
stated repeatedly that he and his colleagues felt that Omdal was not a sufficiently experienced 
solo pilot to fly such an airplane, and that he was not nearly competent enough as a mechanic 
to be able to handle the airplane in Arctic conditions.
206
 After the fateful test flight in May, the 
Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight to reach the North Pole was cancelled again, this time for 
good. 
That the airplane was criticized in the media as poorly constructed and faulty sparked a 
reaction from Larsen. His letter indicates that Amundsen or Hammer issued a statement in the 
press to the effect that the factory had been “selling them a faulty engine”207 and “deceived” 
them into buying the airplanes from Larsen.
208
 This provoked him into threatening legal 
actions against Amundsen. Larsen appears to have been angered by Amundsen’s efforts to put 
all the blame on others. Having received the equipment from Larsen, Amundsen then shipped 
the crated airplanes 3,000 miles, first across America by train, then north by boat (on deck), 
and finally across land to Wainwright in Northern Canada. Amundsen then left the shipment 
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exposed to an Arctic winter, and finally he had the planes assembled by an unskilled 
individual. Larsen claimed that Amundsen did not allow two mechanics and a “crack” pilot to 
accompany the expedition.
209
 The pilot in question was named Fullerton.
210
 When the attempt 
was unsuccessful, Larsen claimed, the blame was put on him for selling Amundsen “old” 
equipment.
211
 Larsen also demanded payment, as the contracted amount Amundsen was to 
pay, was USD 20,000, of which only USD 11,500 had been received. Larsen was particularly 
angered when Hammer claimed that Amundsen had said, with regard to the missing funds, 
that: “Mr Larsen is a rich man and does not need the money.”212 That the media had claimed 
that the Larsen airplanes were faulty can be confirmed in numerous articles. Aftenposten went 
as far as to claim that the crash of Elizabeth (I) was the fault of Larsen for selling Amundsen 
an airplane that “should have been broken up years ago”.213 The outcome of the issue with Mr 
Larsen was that Hammer wrote a statement saying that the information that had been 
published in the media was “unfounded”214 and that Amundsen’s expedition had failed due to 
“(…) climatic obstacles and insufficient technical organization at Capt. Amundsen’s 
command in the North.”215  
The letter from Larsen to Hammer and Amundsen has not been published before, and the 
claims are those of Larsen himself, but his story sheds some light on the difficulties of 
conducting an expedition so far from any technical infrastructure and the consequences of 
negative utterances in the media. The statement from Hammer has never been printed, but 
neither he nor Amundsen went to the media with complaints against Larsen’s airplanes after 
the letter had been received. Thereafter, the expedition’s failure was the result of “bad luck”. 
In the media, the Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight had been a flop, as Aftenposten writes: 
“(…) the news that Roald Amundsen had to abandon his expedition will – we cannot deny it – 
cause national disappointment, and must feel like a defeat for Amundsen.”216 Aftenposten did 
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immediately state that Roald Amundsen had delivered the message as a true man, which 
should be honoured in light of his earlier achievements.
217
  
Dagbladet, which was not part of the media–expedition cooperation, was not as kind in their 
attacks on Amundsen, as they wrote that he had been a disappointment to his many fans. The 
paper also attacked his optimism, his lack of planning, which they deemed “foolhardy”, and 
that he had “underestimated the difficulty” of working in the Arctic. Furthermore, the paper 
criticized how long it took for the news to arrive, 40 days. Dagbladet claimed that the two 
safety-expeditions that had been sent north to safeguard Amundsen on his flight could have 
been stopped sooner, minimizing the cost. 
218
  
One of the expeditions had cost the Norwegian government NOK 60,000. Stortinget approved 
of using the funds on a safety-expedition for the Maud Expedition Transarctic flight in 1923. 
The funds were approved with six votes against, and there was no debate on the subject.
219
 
The choices made by Amundsen proved to be a problem later, as one member of the Storting 
stated that he did not wish to support such “foolish” flying ventures a second time.220 Still, the 
fact that the Norwegian government took action to help Amundsen shows that he was still a 
person of interest.  
Amundsen’s business partner Hammer also organized a private safety expedition along with 
the Junker aircraft company
221
 and Norsk Luftseiladsforening (Aeroclub of Norway).
222
 The 
private safety expedition arranged by Hammer was followed with curiosity, but it did not 
achieve anything definite. 
That Roald Amundsen failed in his first polar flight was good news for the comic press. They 
criticized Amundsen as a lunatic, and claimed that the money spent on him should have been 
spent on a lock to keep him under control, and also on the government, who were all too 
willing to spend money that could have been put to better use elsewhere.
223
 Hvepsen 
                                                          
217
 Not signed. ”Roald Amundsen har opgit polflyvningen” Aftenposten. Year 64. No 35. Tuesday, 19 June 1923.  
218
 Not signed. ”Amundsen opgir sin polar-flyvning” Dagbladet. Year 55. No 139. Tuesday, 19 June 1923. 
219
 Kongeriket Norges toogsyttiende ordentlige Stortingsforhandlinger 7a / 7b 1923. 1702. 
220
 Kongeriket Norges fireogsyttiende ordentlige Stortingsforhandlinger 7a / 7b 1925. 653 (speaker was J. 
Christiansen). 
221
 Not signed. ”Ogsaa en amerikansk-tysk sikringsekspedition for Amundsen til Spitsbergen?” Aftenposten. 
Year 64. No 300. Tuesday, 29 May 1923. 
222
 Not signed. ”Konsul Hammer erklærer, at han under enhver omstændighet vil starte.” Aftenposten. Year 64. 
No 308. Friday, 1 June 1923.  
223
 Not signed. ”Fra vore korrespondenter.” Hvepsen. Year 18. No 21. Saturday, 2 June 1923. 
45 
 
continued its attacks throughout 1923 and well into 1924. Karikaturen used the occasion to 
state that: “1923 was the year when Roald did not fly, again.”224  
The Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight marked a 
shift in how Roald Amundsen explored by 
introducing the airplane. The introduction of a 
technological machine to hasten the work of 
exploration was nothing new. Robert Scott had 
included motorised sleighs on his fateful Antarctic 
expedition, in competition with Amundsen’s dogs. 
The machines back then were unreliable, but that 
was changing, and Amundsen chose to include 
airplanes on his Maud expedition. In general, 
airplane designs and mechanical engines were steadily becoming more and more reliable, and 
the understanding of mechanics expanded. The inclusion of airplanes in polar exploration was 
seen as a benefit. With an airplane, several days or even weeks of muscle-based effort could 
be completed in mere hours. The 1920’s were also a time of dramatic aeronautical 
development, as the Larsen airplanes proved with their endurance records. The First World 
War had introduced many people to the art of flying through military service, and the 
airplanes developed during the war were the beginning of man’s romance with flying. In 
America, where Amundsen operated, flying had taken on a religious aspect. Amundsen had 
already learned the hard way that in order to tap this mechanical resource, one had to be 
prepared. To achieve results, one had to use logistics, planning, know-how, and a lot of 
money. Logistics was needed to get the machines, their spare parts to the right place and all 
the proper tools. Planning to make sure that one had what one needed on site. Know-how, or 
knowledge, of the machines and how they were affected by their environment. Last there was 
funding, which was needed to make all a reality. 
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3 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight
225
 
“We, I and my comrades, cannot promise to reach the pole, but we will do what we can.”226 
 
Amundsen’s response to the spectacular failure of his first attempt to fly across the North Pole 
was to seek out better equipment and try again as soon as possible. While still full of 
ambition, Amundsen lacked money. His last expedition had brought him into a questionable 
alliance with Hakon Hammer. That alliance was soon broken due to Amundsen’s bankruptcy. 
His further efforts to raise funds brought him into a lasting cooperation with a private sponsor, 
Lincoln Ellsworth, who donated enough funds to buy the needed airplanes. Amundsen also 
made an alliance with an institution and the media to organize and fund the rest of the 
expedition.  
The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight was based on the plan and equipment from an earlier 
expedition attempt that was cancelled at the last minute. When the Maud Expedition 
Transarctic Flight was aborted in 1923, Amundsen continued his cooperation with Hammer. 
According to Tor Bomann-Larsen, it was a cooperation that had an air of desperation about 
it.
227
 Hammer and Amundsen planned their new expedition in 1924. Tor Bomann-Larsen 
writes: “There is no purpose in reconstructing the monetary building [that Hammer created] 
seventy years after it collapsed.”228 It may be interesting to take a brief look at the plans of 
1924. Roald Berg states that Hammer acted as a guarantor for the economical side and made a 
host of business deals.
229
 The sources of the finances were press rights, movie rights and 
publishing rights. The plans for the expedition are to be found in Norsk Luftseiladsforening’s 
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archives, and called for three Dornier model Wal (whale) airplanes that were manufactured in 
Germany, but assembled in Pisa, Italy in order to circumvent the Versailles Treaty. As a 
consequence, Roald Amundsen met with Benito Mussolini on 7 April 1924.
230
 The plan called 
for an American (USA) and three Italian crewmembers, a photographer, three Norwegian 
pilots, and Roald Amundsen, and was estimated to cost USD 300,000.
231
 The plans were 
launched to the public on 19 December 1923, in all the major Norwegian newspapers.
232
 
Funds came from the USA, Germany and Norway. The expedition was supposed to be 
Norwegian in essence, but Bomann-Larsen writes that it had been sold as a national affair 
both in the USA and Norway.
233
 When the preparations were to begin, and it was time to start 
paying bills, it turned out that Hammer had neither sponsors nor funds. Officially, the 
expedition was abandoned due to “lack of funding”.234  
Amundsen, trapped in legal obligations, considered himself insolvent and filed for 
bankruptcy.
235
 At the time, this was a public disgrace. Bomann-Larsen states that Hammer 
was known to have been involved in financial scandals before, and Amundsen knew this, as 
the information surfaced in 1922, when he was directly informed. He was also made aware of 
this fact on several subsequent occasions.
236
  
The legacy of Hammer hampered Amundsen’s later expeditions. Some good did come out of 
the failure, as Roald Berg point out, as Amundsen came in contact with a group of pilots 
centred around Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, including Oscar Omdal and Odd Dahl. Berg states that 
Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen had come into the project at an early stage, as a technical consultant for 
Leon Amundsen and as a pilot during one of the safety expeditions sent to Spitsbergen in 
1923.
237
 During the planned expedition with Hammer, he was to be the leader of one of the 
airplanes.
238
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As with all of Roald Amundsen’s expeditions, differences exist in the accounts of how 
Amundsen came into contact with Norsk Luftseiladsforening (NLF, Aeroclub of Norway) and 
what role this institution played in the expedition. These differences are telling, as they show 
the many different perspectives that has been used to understand the expedition and what has 
been seen as important in the expedition. The purpose is to show that there is room for more 
research on the subject. 
Amundsen himself writes in Flukten til 88° Nord that he asked the NLF to cooperate, and 
“they welcomed me with open arms.”239 He then mentions the meeting with Lincoln 
Ellsworth. Amundsen makes a point to thank Rolf Thommessen, Arnold Ræstad
240
, Johan 
Sverre
241
, and the support of several governments (without specifying which ones).
242
 
Together, they would create an expedition whose aim was to explore the Arctic from 
Spitsbergen to the North Pole in order to ascertain “scientifically” if there was any land in the 
north or not.
243
 The focus was on the deed of the expedition.  
Both Roald Amundsen and the NLF are reduced to mere bystanders in Bomann-Larsen’s 
account. In Bomann-Larsen’s biography of Amundsen, Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen is awarded the 
leading role. Riiser-Larsen was instrumental to Amundsen, as he was the one who brought the 
planned expedition to NLF and made it possible to arrange the expedition under the auspices 
of NLF.
244
 Another important figure to Bomann-Larsen is Lincoln Ellsworth, who generously 
donated his father’s funds. Both Ellsworth and Riiser-Larsen were necessary for Roald 
Amundsen’s comeback after his bankruptcy.245 Ellsworth provided the funds while Riiser-
Larsen planned and worked on the expedition on a daily basis.
246
 Bomann-Larsen mentions 
the NLF, claiming that on 9 March 1925, Roald Amundsen met with his “partners” in NLF 
and that they elected Rolf Thommessen as president of a company that would be the legal 
entity executing the expedition. Furthermore, Bomann-Larsen writes that this move was done 
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explicitly so that Amundsen’s private finances would not be mixed with that of the 
expedition.
247
  
Roald Berg writes an alternative account where he more clearly defines the link between 
Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, Leon Amundsen and Norsk Luftseiladsforening. Berg views Hjalmar 
Riiser-Larsen as a consultant for Leon Amundsen on flying issues, and Riiser-Larsen became 
the link between Roald Amundsen and the NLF (Thommessen).
248
 In Berg’s account, the 
NLF was an administrative support apparatus needed to successfully administer the 
expedition.
249
 Berg sees the NLF as a lobby group for flying enthusiasts, but not as a financial 
backer. In Berg’s opinion, the funds came mostly from Lincoln Ellsworth, public funding and 
press contracts. Berg includes and makes a point of showing the support from the Norwegian 
government and what the expedition meant for Norway, as Norway was to acquire formal 
control over Spitsbergen the same year.  
Thommessen claims in his own account, written years later when he and Amundsen were 
embroiled in hostile litigation, that he received a request from Amundsen in which he asked 
whether the NLF could take responsibility for organizing an expedition that Amundsen had 
planned. The board of the NLF met and discussed the issue. Initially, there was strong 
opposition to the idea, mostly due to economic constraints and reflections on how Amundsen 
had conducted himself during his cooperation with Hammer. The board came to the 
conclusion that if it was to take on the task, it had to have complete administrative and 
economical leadership, and that all income would be put into the NLF treasury. This was 
acceptable to Amundsen. 
250
  
In October 1924, the newspaper Dagbladet reported that Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen had plans to 
fly to the North Pole in 1925 with two airplanes, and sought funds. His plan was to offer the 
leadership of the expedition to Roald Amundsen.
 251
 This was how the media was told the first 
tentative steps towards a new expedition were taken. This is what later became the 
Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight. 
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Another question that has implications for the understanding of the expedition is the question 
of who was the actual leader? In Amundsen’s account, there are two leaders, Amundsen and 
Ellsworth. Riiser Larsen was second in command. Bomann-Larsen has a mixed view, as he 
considers Amundsen as a leader, but not the actual leader. He claims that Amundsen was the 
leader because he had Ellsworth’s funds as backup252, while his number two was Riiser-
Larsen, who did the day-to-day planning. Bomann-Larsen changes his view and explains that 
Amundsen was not an absolute leader at all, as he was not able to (secretly) influence the 
crew to make the expedition a transarctic expedition (to Alaska) rather than a polar flight, and 
concludes that Amundsen was not the de facto leader of the expedition, as he did not have the 
support necessary to make changes at will.
253
 
Amundsen, Ellsworth and Riiser-Larsen were the official leaders of the expedition itself; the 
leader of the organization that arranged and coordinated the expedition was Thommessen.  
Amundsen did a tour of the USA to help fund the expedition and repay his creditors. His 
impresario was Lee Keedick, who had been so since 1912. Amundsen frequently travelled to 
the United States to give lectures focusing on the South Pole expedition
254
 and the “First 
circumnavigation of the Arctic basin.”255  
On his tour in 1924, Amundsen met Lincoln Ellsworth and made a lasting alliance with 
Lincoln, who became his private sponsor. James Ellsworth, Lincoln’s father was a well-
known coal-mining millionaire and through him, Lincoln was able to fund the airplanes for 
the expedition. Ellsworth was an engineer, trailblazer and geologist who had led several 
geological expeditions to the Andes. He saw himself as a collector of rare sights and 
impressions. As the son of a coal-mining millionaire, he had the resources necessary, and he 
wanted to sponsor Amundsen for the sole purpose of joining the expedition. Ellsworth was 
able to donate USD 85,000 to the expedition,
256
 which was enough to pay for the airplanes 
needed for an attempted flight.  
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The money was immediately transferred to Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, who bought two Dornier 
Wal airplanes.
 257
 This action caused a dispute with the board of NLF, who felt bypassed as 
economic managers and the proper organ who should receive the money and by the 
airplanes.
258
 In a series of telegrams, NLF asked Amundsen if he wanted to continue the 
cooperation, since his actions led them to believe that they were no longer needed. Amundsen, 
possibly full of enthusiasm, asked for a postponement of the contract, and the NLF duly 
informed Amundsen that they felt that the venture was over for their part, if Amundsen so 
chose. But Amundsen chose to cooperate,
259
 and sent a telegram to the NLF, asking them to 
continue to lead the expedition.
260
 He sent them the remaining USD 5,000 of the USD 85,000 
first donated by Ellsworth. He also transferred ownership of the airplanes to the NLF, and 
agreed that all future income would go directly to the NLF. So Amundsen chose to give the 
economic and administrative leadership of his planned expedition to the NLF and Rolf 
Thommessen. 
In order to safeguard those who wanted to help Amundsen, the administration founded a stock 
company that would be the legal entity economically responsible for and owner of the 
expedition; A/S Roald Amundsens Polflyvning 1925.
 261
 It appears to have been a daughter 
company of A/S Norsk Luftseiladsforening. Both Amundsen and Ellsworth were hired by A/S 
Roald Amundsen Polflyvning 1925 as leaders of an expedition to the North Pole under the 
economic and administrative leadership of NLF. As a leader Amundsen, would have a fixed 
salary and 50% of any surplus.
262
 Amundsen agreed completely, but he wanted, and got, 
unlimited control during the polar flight itself. Ellsworth also accepted the contract and was 
hired as a navigator on the terms that the expedition would carry the Norwegian flag, that he 
would be the only American on the expedition, and he also insisted on not being paid a salary 
(since it was, after all, his money). Riiser-Larsen and Leif Dietrichson were hired as pilots. 
Oscar Omdal was hired at a later stage as a mechanic, and Karl Feucht (an engine specialist 
from Dornier) was included in the expedition on Spitsbergen mere days before take-off.  
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Amundsen, Ellsworth and Riiser-Larsen were de jure hired men of the expedition, although 
they were de facto leaders. The arrangement was a way to give Amundsen a clean slate to 
work with. Amundsen’s cooperation and involvement with Hammer had resulted in a 
situation where Amundsen was legally obliged to honour contracts made by Hammer, but as 
the funds had vanished, he was no longer able to honour them. Amundsen was legally 
bankrupt, and all income or advances that went to his person would be confiscated to pay off 
debt from the Maud expedition and to compensate former investors. By being an employee of 
a stock company owned and operated by Norsk Luftseiladsforening, Amundsen was protected 
from these contracts and creditors. His name and symbolic status was given to the expedition, 
but his personal legal complications was kept outside of it. According to Hjalmar Riiser-
Larsen, the expedition was made out to be a stock company in order to make sure that the 
profits went to the participants as salary in order to avoid taxes. The stock company 
arrangement would also protect the members of NLF from financial trouble, should the 
expedition fail.
263
 
There appears to be a consensus on the role of Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen as a central character in 
brokering the contact between Roald Amundsen and Norsk Luftseiladsforening, and as a link 
between Roald Amundsen and Rolf Thommessen. There is also consensus on the role of 
Lincoln Ellsworth as an important source of funds, but whose actual role was not clearly 
defined. However, there is not a consensus on the role and place of the NLF as both Berg and 
Bomann-Larsen tone down the role of the institution. The NLF was the legal owner of A/S 
Roald Amundsens polfyvning 1925, and the participants were hired men. It can be claimed 
that the contracts and cooperation with the NLF was a pro-forma arrangement set up to bypass 
creditors and legal issues. But it may also be viewed as a statement that Amundsen was no 
longer the absolute ruler of his own expeditions. 
There is a consensus stating that Roald Amundsen’s knowledge and skills were not critical to 
the completion of the expedition. His major contribution was his name and status, as the hero 
and symbol for Norway and others. His fame had attracted a wealthy sponsor; others did the 
day-to-day preparations and physical work. 
When Ellsworth donated his funds to the expedition, the NLF decided that it had sufficient 
funding to begin setting things in motion. To fund the rest of the expedition, Rolf 
Thommessen and his Tidens Tegn proved critical, and it is worth looking at how other 
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historians have treated the relationship between journalist and explorer. Tor Bomann-Larsen 
does not mention the cooperation between Amundsen and the media, but on the other hand, he 
does specifically state and makes a point of the fact that reporters were an important part of 
the expedition.
264
 Roald Berg writes in Norsk Polarhistorie that the cooperation between 
Roald Amundsen and Rolf Thommessen was a strong alliance between the “polar 
adventurers” and the press,265 but Berg does not dwell on the details of the alliance. Both 
historians agree that the media were important. The nature of the cooperation was to raise the 
funds needed in addition to the generous donation from Lincoln Ellsworth.  
The expedition’s funding was greatly aided by having a professional media man on top, 
although the sale of the news did not go exactly as planned, mostly due to the legal legacy of 
Hakon Hammer. The NLF had considerable trouble in selling the story of the expedition to 
foreign newspapers. Several newspapers claimed that they had made deals with Amundsen 
through Hammer and would keep Amundsen accountable for those contracts. NLF refused, as 
it was an expedition organized and led by A/S Roald Amundsens polflyvning 1925. 
Amundsen the employee was not a legal part of the expedition’s finances. One British 
newspaper, the Times, flatly refused to do business with Amundsen on the grounds that “(…) 
they had never had business with anyone who showed so little regard to his commitments.”266 
Another paper, the Berliner Tageblatt, did not want to have anything to do with Amundsen 
due to the paper’s past experience with him.267 Two other newspapers demanded that any cost 
regarding news they bought would be deducted from any new contract.
268
  
Although there was trouble, there were interested buyers. Internationally, the New York Times 
bought the rights for the continental USA. Newspapers in the British Empire bought news 
from Central News, a syndicate, where interested newspapers pooled funds and purchased the 
rights from that company. In Norway, Rolf Thommessen’s own newspaper, Tidens Tegn, the 
rival Aftenposten and many others bought the news, although there are no contracts or sources 
that show exactly what they paid. The close cooperation between media and the expedition 
did have some other results, for instance the media not affiliated with the expedition were 
respectful with regard to the wishes of expedition members. At one time, Riiser-Larsen asked 
the press not to write on the expedition in order to keep it in the dark from possible 
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competitors. This was honoured by the papers.
269
 Fredrik Ramm, a journalist who usually 
worked for Tidens Tegn, was hired by A/S Roald Amundsens Polflyvning 1925 to be the 
correspondent. For this, he was given a wage of NOK 666.67 a month, free travel and 
board.
270
 Ramm wrote much of what was printed in the newspapers and which the audience 
read and based their opinion on. He wrote so much that it is quite possible that texts marked 
as written by Roald Amundsen or other leaders of the expedition, were written by Ramm. To 
show the scale of the relationship between the press and expedition, it is enlightening to look 
at the account of Thommessen, who writes in his legal case against Amundsen that most of 
the staff and resources at his newspaper were in some way involved with NLF and the 
expedition for free.
271
 Tidens Tegn and the expedition were almost one entity, woven tightly 
together, as there was intermixture of both interest and people between the expedition and the 
reporting media, i.e. a protocooperation. But this information was not circulated in the news 
reported to the public. The focus in the news was on Amundsen and the task at hand, it was 
not on the cooperation between expedition and media. 
The Norwegian and international media bought the news from NLF, written by Ramm. This 
made an impact on the view of the expedition held in Norway. As most newspapers were in 
one way or another a customer of NLF, most of the media portrayed the expedition similarly, 
in some cases identically and universally positive. The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight 
received broad coverage in Aftenposten, Dagbladet and Tidens Tegn. The plans for the 
expedition were launched in the media on 11 April 1925. In every paper, the very same article 
was written, the exact same words printed, including Roald Amundsen’s account of how 
things were planned and how the expedition was to be conducted. The first account did not 
make the front page in any paper, and there were no comments printed.
272
 But interest in the 
expedition steadily grew as time passed and the launch date neared. The expedition was 
launched from Kings Bay in Spitsbergen (Svalbard from August 1925). The expedition left 
for the North Pole on 21 May 1925, and the story was in the papers the following day. 
Although there were variations on title and amount of coverage, most of the articles were 
identical in nature. The only media participant seemingly critical was Hvepsen, which stated 
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the following on Roald Amundsen’s expedition plans in the pre-phase of the expedition: 
“Adventure, say some. Courage, say others. Sport, say we. Sport under a mask of science.”273  
The expedition was also expanded to include about 30 members, working with logistics, 
maintenance and much more. Of these members, six were to attempt the Pole using two 
airplanes, N24 and N25. Due to restraints from both the NLF and Ellsworth’s family, they 
were not allowed to attempt a flight across the Arctic basin. The decision was to go to the 
Pole, reconnoitre, and return to Kings Bay. Although Amundsen tried to change the rules of 
the game before take-off, he was voted down, as the crew were not interested in making the 
polar flight into a trans-polar flight.
274
  
The coverage after take-off was similar. Everything that was even remotely related to polar 
activities was seen as good material. Most articles from the 24 days the expedition were lost, 
can be divided into four loose groups. First, those with the expectation that Amundsen would 
soon return with a new polar record and information on the possibilities in the north, which 
dominated the first week. Second were articles related to informing the public that Amundsen 
would soon return, and that there was no point in worrying. Included were also articles on the 
constant pressure on the news desks for new information. The third group also claim that 
Amundsen would be back soon, but in addition, these voiced calls for sending help. The idea 
of sending help had been voiced since day three of the expedition from abroad, and in Norway 
from the second week. NLF officially asked for a rescue operation on Saturday 5 June 
1925.
275
 At the time, there were plans for three different expeditions to look for the polar 
explorers. The fourth group of articles relate to the preparation for the safety expeditions and 
re-runs of earlier articles and background material on other polar explorers. The dominant 
view was positive, but worried.  
As people began considering the idea of the expedition being lost, and most of the aviation 
world was scrambling to join a search, a sealer arrived at Kings Bay with the expedition 
participants. They had crash landed in the pack ice at 87⁰ 44ʹ north and had spent weeks 
attempting to get airborne. At the last attempt on the day that had been declared as the point of 
no return, they managed to get airborne. They were forced to land at Nordaustlandet and were 
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spotted, by pure chance, by a sealer. The crew left the airplane in a bay and sailed back to 
Kings Bay. Later the airplane was retrieved and flown back to Kings Bay.  
The crew returned after 24 days in “the realm of death”, as it was aptly called by Bomann-
Larsen.
276
 The return was launched in the media on 19 June 1925, with the same article signed 
by Roald Amundsen, and depending on the newspaper, there were various amounts of other 
polar news as well.
277
 After the failed attempt at the North Pole, the expedition members were 
received as heroes in Norway. When Amundsen’s expedition had disappeared, the navy 
vessel Farm and two naval airplanes were used in the search. The funding for this safety 
expedition was approved without debate.
278279
 Hvepsen was critical to the increase of 
Amundsen’s national salary, which was raised to an annual sum of NOK 12,000. “Why? 
Because he did not find the [North] Pole?”280 Karikaturen appears to have been glad that their 
Amundsen had returned: “(…) our anxiety and longing has been remunerated, our fear with 
joy has been fully repaid (…)”281 Another member of the comic press, Korsaren, writes a 
honorary text that gives the impression that Roald Amundsen had gone to war, “Six brave 
warriors are welcomed back 
(...).”282 Korsaren writes that they 
had fought for 24 days with the 
“never-ending wave of ice” near 
the Pole. The expedition returned, 
flying, and “Mother Norway wept 
in joy to have such sons back,” and 
in a two-page caricature Roald 
Amundsen appears to be knighted 
by a Norwegian Viking.
283
  
Hvepsen continued to stand against 
Amundsen’s expedition, on the 
grounds that it was not scientific. It 
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also criticized the expedition for filling the newspapers with advertisements for all the 
different industrial products that had been “instrumental” in securing a happy outcome of the 
expedition. The magazine was sceptical to the commercialization that was going on. Other 
magazines in the comic press were not critical, both Karikaturen and Korsaren seem to be 
positive toward the expedition. In essence, the pre-phase and disappearance of the expedition 
were dominated by positive coverage. Although the expedition was lost, there was no 
negative news printed on the expedition, with the exception of Hvepsen. The two major items 
of importance that were not printed in any media, was first that Amundsen was a paid 
employee of a company that bore his name, owned by the NLF, which was the real power 
behind the expedition. Second, that the expedition had failed to complete its goal: to reach the 
North Pole. The expedition turned from sensational polar stunt to sensational survivor drama.  
Amundsen and his expeditions may have been used to further the agenda of the Norwegian 
government and the newspaper Tidens Tegn. Ida Blom writes in Kampen om Eirik Raudes 
Land that the newspaper and its editor Thommessen were both pro-Fascist
284
 and identifies 
Rolf Thommessen as an influential member of a pressure group working on claiming 
Greenland for the Norwegian cause, and which had done so since 1923.
285
 Henrik P. 
Thommessen writes in Fra triumf til tragedie that Rolf Thommessen was a supporter of 
several political parties, namely Frisinnede Venstre, Høyre and Fedrelandslaget.
286
 Henrik P. 
Thommessen also writes that Rolf Thommessen had a romantic opinion of Greenland as an 
“ancient part” of the nation-state Norway.287 Blom states that Tidens Tegn was the most 
enthusiastic newspaper in voicing the view that Norway should acquire Greenland.
288
 Rolf 
Thommessen’s involvement in the expedition may have been influenced by his political 
conviction to make Greenland Norwegian, and it is probable that he used Amundsen and his 
popularity to boost the views of his lobby group, thus furthering his own agenda. It can be 
claimed that the close cooperation between the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight and Tidens 
Tegn may have caused more interest in other polar activities.  
The enthusiasm for all matters polar that the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight created 
through the media frenzy, may have strengthened the perception that the Arctic was where 
Norway belonged and should expand. The expedition might have inspired the trend of 
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nationalistic expansion, which later evolved into what has been termed the Norwegian polar 
imperialism. In addition to a media-fuelled source of inspiration, there appears to have been a 
political will to support the expedition, as it may have been beneficial to the Norwegian 
government’s agenda of planting the Norwegian flag in the Arctic. 
The Norwegian government had an established mode of operation in regard to Amundsen, 
where the government had supported him time and again without debate and with a 
unanimous vote. This can be interpreted as a way to show national interest in the Arctic and 
as a way to continue and nourish the cultural idea of a polar nation. 
 The Norwegian government was involved in the expedition on many different levels. The 
direct support was the supply ship Farm. The Norwegian government made the ship available 
to the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight and to an expedition by Adolf Hoel to study the 
geological formations on Spitsbergen. The loan of Farm was worth NOK 25,000, and was 
paid by the government of Norway.
289
 The debate on funding Farm and allowing the ship to 
be used in Roald Amundsen’s expedition was extensive and sheds light on many issues. 
Those members who were against the funding considered the expedition to be 
“sportsmanlike”, and that it was a private initiative and it should remain so, as the government 
had little funds to spare. One member claimed that giving Amundsen these funds was likely to 
send him to his grave, as airplanes were unsafe.  
Those who were inclined to fund the expedition claimed that they saw the NOK 25,000 not 
only as a contribution, but also as a sign of confidence in Roald Amundsen. One member, 
Karl Wilhelm Wefring
290
, claimed that the Storting should not forget what Amundsen had 
done for Norway in the past. Amundsen’s achievement of being the first man through the 
Northwest Passage, the Northeast Passage, and the conqueror of the South Pole, had turned 
Norway into a famous and respected nation. Was this the time to fail him? Wefring claimed 
that if the funds were not donated, the world would see it as a sign of lack of confidence in 
Roald Amundsen and his expedition, and this would not be “understood” abroad.291  
Another member of the Storting, Carl Joachim Hambro, claimed that if Amundsen planted the 
Norwegian flag on the North Pole, and the Storting had not funded part of the expedition, 
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Norway would not be able to claim that the North Pole as a matter of interest for the 
Norwegian nation. Hambro explicitly looked at the funds as a national-political issue and not 
as a personal gift to Roald Amundsen.
292
 Hambro’s statements must be viewed in light of his 
book Norske Næringsinteresser på Grønland (Norwegian commercial interests in 
Greenland), where he states that Norway had had and continued to have historical and 
national reasons to dispute a Danish claim to Greenland.
293
  
The prime minister, Johan Ludvig Mowinckel, stated that he did not see Roald Amundsen’s 
expedition as a “sport deed,” as he stated: “(...) Even there, something bigger and different is 
at the core.”294 He also stated that Amundsen’s actions connected Norway with the Arctic, 
where Norway now had considerable interests. In the opinion of the prime minister, 
Amundsen was, besides Nansen, the man whose deeds had shown that Norway had 
considerable interests in the Arctic. Mowinckel also claimed that Norway and the Norwegian 
people were so closely tied up with Roald Amundsen that a “no” would “not be understood in 
the world”. In short, Norway could not say no to fund Roald Amundsen’s expedition.295 The 
funding was approved with 87 votes for and 54 votes against.
296
 Amundsen had lost the 
ultimate sign of approval: a unanimous vote. But he was still supported by a majority. 
Wefring, Hambro and Mowinckel were all powerful political figures in their day and age, and 
the debate shows that these powerful members of Norwegian politics considered it vital that 
Roald Amundsen received support for his expedition based on national political interests. The 
prime minister stated that Roald Amundsen and Norway was virtually one. This may be 
interpreted as Roald Amundsen in some ways being a part of Norwegian foreign policy. This 
was, however, not the only direct support the government gave the expedition.  
There was considerably more cooperation between the expedition and the Norwegian 
government, but these issues were not discussed. For a start, the expedition received certain 
benefits saving the expedition a lot of expenses, such as custom duties. All goods marked as a 
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part of the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight were duty-free.
297
 This was a request from the 
NLF, approved by the Royal Department of Finance and Customs.
298
  
The import of the airplanes was duty-free, but the planes still had to be registered in Norway 
and be approved as fit to fly. This posed a problem, as it would take a lot of time to find an 
expert and have him come to Spitsbergen to inspect the airplanes and approve their status of 
airworthiness. The solution was to ask if the expedition’s pilot, Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, could 
approve the airworthiness of the airplanes. A letter from Forsvarsdepartementets Luftfartsråd 
(The Defence Ministry’s Aviation Council) to the NLF states that there was a lot of missing 
information in the registration forms they had received, and they also noted that the NLF had 
asked if Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen could be the man who approved the airworthiness of the two 
Dornier Wal airplanes. The department approved the airplanes’ registration, and they accepted 
that Riiser-Larsen did the technical inspection on the grounds that he was employed by their 
administration and that he, as a member of the expedition, would be more interested in a 
flight-worthy airplane than any other person the department could appoint as inspector.
299
 The 
airplanes were approved by Riiser-Larsen. In a later letter sent by the department, which also 
contained the formal airworthiness certificates, the department stated that due to all the 
missing information, the certificates were only valid for the duration of the polar flight and 
had to be reissued if the planes were to fly in mainland Norway.
300
 
Amundsen was also used in Norwegian propaganda, as correspondence found in the NLF 
archives show that the Norwegian government used the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight to 
show the world “what it is to be Norwegian and what Norway is.”301 Tor Bomann-Larsen 
writes that a government employee at the Norwegian legation in London continuously handed 
over information on a possible competitor to Rolf Thommessen.
302
 Another aspect of political 
assistance was that the Norwegian government used its influence in Spitsbergen to deny a 
journalist from a competing media organ, the Associated Press, access to the telegraph station 
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at Kings Bay when the Amundsen-Ellsworth expedition disappeared. The last, but far from 
the least sign of cooperation was that the Norwegian government issued an order to 
Amundsen and his men to claim any land they found in the name of His Majesty the King of 
Norway.  
To cover the remaining expenses, NLF would seek advances from the media, and to make 
sure they would receive income after the expedition, they made plans to make a film, book 
and arrange lectures. This helps show the commercial nature of the expedition, besides the 
close cooperation with the newspapers. The nature of the financing also shows that the 
expedition became decreasingly related to science and increasingly related to sensation and 
sport. During the expedition, they filmed what happened. The raw footage was cut into a film, 
“The polar film”. The rights to the film distribution for the 1925 Amundsen-Ellsworth 
expedition were sold to J. Chr. Gundersen. His contract with NLF allowed him to use two 
copies of the film, and the income from tickets and advertisements were to be split, with 70% 
going to the NLF and 30% to Gundersen.
303
 Gundersen’s work with the film resulted in an 
income of NOK 35,700 from Norway alone. Abroad, Gundersen was less fortunate. He 
declined an offer of USD 50,000 for the world rights from First National Films. He stated that 
more could be had from selling the film rights to individual countries. However, further 
correspondence show that this did not go as Gundersen had thought it would. The end result 
was that he sold the rights for the film to Pathe for USD 20,000, with rights for Canada, 
Argentine and the US, while he used First National to distribute “The polar film” to the rest of 
the world, having both parties receive a 50–50 split of the income.304 One of the reasons they 
accepted the USD 20,000 offer from Pathe, was that they feared that the MacMillan 
Expedition might reach the North Pole, disrupting the sales and interest in the NLF and 
Amundsen’s “polar film”, which after all only depicted an attempt at the North Pole, not a 
successful conquest.
305
 Although there were missed opportunities, NLF still managed to 
acquire a substantial amount of money from “The polar film”, but not as much as NLF might 
have wished for. The film was a direct commercial and sensational move to boost income, and 
its scientific value was nil. 
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Another source of income from the expedition’s aftermath was lectures. Lectures were a 
major source of income in the 1920’s, and it was traditional for polar explorers to travel the 
world and give lectures, for a fee, to those who were interested in hearing what had transpired 
during their voyages. It was yet another commercial move used to make polar explorers rich 
and famous abroad. Amundsen was not the first, and he was not the last to embark on a 
lecture tour. After the 1925 expedition, which was honestly a close brush with death, there 
was tremendous interest in hearing what had happened and how they had managed to survive 
from the horse’s mouth. In the early autumn of 1925, Amundsen was on a tour of the major 
capitals in Europe before launching a grand tour of the USA, but before that, he had a smaller 
tour in Britain. The Lecture Agency, led by Gerald Christy, informed the NLF that Amundsen 
would fetch as much as GBP 100 for each lecture.
306
 Each lecture was worth NOK 2,500. In 
comparison, a common worker in Norway earned about NOK 350 a month.
307
 Amundsen’s 
British tour was short. In five days, he held seven lectures, each at GBP 100.
308
 The deal made 
with the Lecture Agency called for them to receive 10% of the sum, and the NLF would 
receive the rest. Later that year, in November, Leif Dietrichson cooperated with the Lecture 
Agency to set up a tour of the smaller cities in Britain.
309
 In the USA where lectures were the 
preferred way of hearing of expeditions, Lee Keedick, a well-known manager of explorers, 
was Amundsen’s manager. He was on a contract with the NLF for the autumn of 1925. The 
deal included that Keedick paid all expenses and that the NLF received 60% of the profit from 
the lecture tour. The contract for the tour was signed in March 1925 by Rolf Thommessen, 
Roald Amundsen and Lee Keedick.
310
 The tour began in Carnegie Hall in New York, and 
continued across the USA. The plan was for Amundsen to tour the nation until June 1926, but 
the plans for a new expedition made that difficult. Instead, Amundsen was released from his 
obligation by Keedick in March, with the understanding that he was to continue his lectures in 
the US after the 1926 expedition was finished.
311
 The lectures were to continue from October 
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1926 to March 1927, in order to fulfil the contract of 1925.
312
 That Amundsen was away on a 
very long lecture tour would have considerable impact on the next expedition, as he became 
even less critical to the completion of the expedition. 
The last major source of income was the book on the expedition. The Norwegian expedition 
members wrote a book on their adventures called Flukten til 88° Nord, which was a longer 
and more elaborate version of what had been printed in the news. There are no known 
documents showing what the book sold or any contracts on the book, but it was reported to 
have sold out the first 6,000 books before lunch on the first day of sale, and that the next 
7,000 copies were in print.
313
 The book was well received in Norway, where Olaf Holtedahl, a 
renowned professor of geology, reviewed it.
314
 There are no figures showing how much 
income the expedition received from the sales of the book, but it may have been a 
considerable amount.  
The book raises other questions. How was it received outside of Norway and how does it 
describe the goal of the expedition? Was the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight related to 
science? The participants in the expedition did claim that the expedition was scientific in 
nature. Lincoln Ellsworth wrote in Problems of Polar Research that the Amundsen-Ellsworth 
Polar Flight’s scientific results were “viewing 120,000 square miles of hitherto unknown 
territory and the taking of two soundings (...) which showed the depth of the polar basin at 
that point to be 3,750 meters (...).”315 The expedition did not use scientific methods in the 
uncovering of the vast tracts of sea and ice they unveiled, they did not photo-document the 
journey and they made few measurements. According to Roald Berg, the expedition was not 
scientific, and he quotes the British Geographical Journal’s claim that the expedition was “a 
story of astonishingly good fortune.”316 Robert Marc Friedman writes that Amundsen’s 
attempt to explore with an airplane seemed less promising in relation to making 
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observations.
317
 Observation is a key part of the scientific method. In short, the Amundsen-
Ellsworth Polar Flight was not scientific; it was a sensational and sportsmanlike venture.  
While the book was, as mentioned, a huge success in Norway cooler heads read the book in 
England. Gerald Tinney wrote a contemporary review of both My Polar Flight (England) and 
Our Polar Flight (USA), and wrote: “The book itself helps us little: written at top speed to 
fulfil a contract, it lacks mature consideration, and can in no sense be regarded as 
constructive.”318 Not promising words on a book that sold the entire first edition during the 
first day in Norway. The review also reveals how the expedition was seen from abroad: Not as 
a national political achievement or a heroic deed, but as a something of a failure, with 
commercial overtones. 
If from the geographical standpoint this plan [Polar Flight] was poorly conceived, the 
success of the venture could be regarded as so much capital, with which to back the 
more difficult and worthier venture of flying from Spitsbergen to Alaska over the 
inaccessible zone of the Beaufort Sea, and it would at the same time be a personal and 
national triumph over previous misfortunes. We must realize how greatly Amundsen 
was hampered by the conventions of a sensation seeking press, on whom he largely 
depended for the finance of his expedition. (…) It [The expedition] is the practical 
demonstration of the difficulties of aircraft for long journeys of polar discovery, which 
gives value to the 1925 Polar Flight.
319
 
According to Ginney, the international use of the expedition was to learn of the difficulties of 
flying in the Arctic, not to study Norwegian heroics. As a final verdict over the expedition, the 
review sums it up in a few lines: 
Between them N.24 and N.25 had been in the air for approximately twenty-five hours 
over the polar basin. During this period they had three forced landings, but in each 
case on water. How amazingly fortunate they were, and how exceedingly unreliable 
the very best aeroplanes are, as yet!
320
 
The magazine Motoring and Aviation names the Amundsen-Ellsworth expedition as a 
“Splendid Failure”, where the heroics were confined to “(...) chopping an air-plane out of the 
Polar ice, levelling a starting field, and flying back in eight hours to contact with 
civilization.”321 To further demonstrate the level of commercialism that defined the 
expedition, one can look at how N25 was used to bring further profit into the treasury. After 
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the expedition, N25 was used in raising additional funds for the upcoming expedition by 
flying from place to place in Norway, being exhibited at local fairs. The pilot Omdal flew the 
airplane from fair to fair.
322
 Lincoln Ellsworth was asked if the airplane should be shipped to 
the USA, where it could be used to bring in further funds, but he replied: “Feel that news of 
trying to exploit our plane at Coney Island would not react well with the public at this time 
(…) it simply means connecting cheap commercialism with the high ideals that everyone 
knows was the spirit of our adventure.”323 The way the expedition was financed did not reflect 
the views of Lincoln Ellsworth. As it is, “The polar film”, the lectures and the book show that 
the expedition was commercial in nature. In the words of Ginney, the expedition was “so 
much capital” that they could use it to fund the next expedition. So how much capital did they 
accumulate? 
The financial status of the Amundsen-Ellsworth Transpolar Flight was strong, according to 
the NLF. In a confidential economic overview, the total expenses of the expedition were 
estimated at NOK 500,000, and the income to NOK 900,000, which would give the company 
an estimated surplus of NOK 400,000. Later, when an accountant looked at the books in 
December 1925, it turned out that the expenses were closer to one million kroner. Thus, the 
expedition was insolvent. It had been projected that the old expedition would have enough 
profit to fund the new expedition, but the accountant claimed that this was not the case. 
Despite the massive effort put down by a host of different sources, the profit was merely NOK 
60,000.
324
 This money was to fund the next expedition, but they were not available, so 
logically A/S Roald Amundsen’s Polflyvning 1925 was insolvent. However, this was only 
temporary, as there was income due that would cover the running expenses. The fact that 
made the company absolutely insolvent was that the accountant pointed out some financial 
irregularities, such as the stock capital of the company. The capital was NOK 2,000, of which 
NOK 1,500 had not been paid. He pointed out that this was not a major issue, but it had to be 
fixed immediately.
 325
 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight has been proclaimed as a successful geographic 
discovery, but in reality, it was a media event that turned into a real-time survivor drama, a 
“heroic failure” which made Amundsen and his friends heroes in Norway. This was in large 
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part due to the media picture created, but also due to the nature of the drama of man against 
nature. But the expedition did not achieve anything substantial, nor did it complete its 
purpose, which was to raise funds for a larger and more worthy expedition; what was to 
become the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transarctic Flight. 
  
67 
 
 
4  
The Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transarctic Flight 
“In 1826, the first steamship came to Norway – in 1926, the first airship (...) both characterize 
the rapid pace of progress during the last 100 years.”326 
 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight was Amundsen’s first successful 
expedition after his conquest of the South Pole. It was also the shortest in duration. As 
Amundsen continued to strive for popular success, he and the expedition became involved 
with commercial and political considerations that made it the most controversial expedition of 
his career. Amundsen wanted to be the first man to cross the polar basin from Spitsbergen to 
Alaska. The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight did not become transarctic, first due to 
restraints from the NLF, and ultimately due to technological failure. After the 1925 flight, 
Amundsen and the NLF started cooperating again, this time seeking success with an airship. 
This resulted in the expedition named the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transarctic Flight. But 
even something as mundane as the name of the expedition came with political strings 
attached.
327
 
The issue of who was considered important for the organization of the expedition and who 
was responsible varies in the primary sources, literature and historical research. Bomann-
Larsen describes the expedition as an international corporation in which Amundsen was a 
CEO. The expedition was based on his name and prestige, but Amundsen was not part of the 
day-to-day business and he had no control over events whatsoever.
328
  
Roald Berg views the aspect of time as important, and states that the expedition was a 
technical system where technology and technicians were the key members, and where the 
international press had a major impact on the funding. Berg also states that the expedition was 
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so large that no single person was critical to it, and that no single person was aware of every 
detail of the expedition.
329
 Alexander Wisting describes Thommessen as having the 
administrative responsibilities as well as the difficult task of devising a plan while Amundsen, 
Ellsworth, and Riiser-Larsen all were busy elsewhere.
330
  
Thommessen described the airship venture in his litigation against Amundsen. Thommessen 
considered what later became the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight as a 
continuation of the contracts and an expansion of the company that had organized the 
previous expedition. Even though Thommessen personally did not want to continue the 
cooperation, he did so in order to retain continuity within the administration.
331
 Thommessen 
claims he accepted the responsibility of negotiating all the press rights and publishing 
rights.
332
 The daily business activities to arrange the expedition were conducted by 
Thommessen, Arnold Ræstad, Alf Bryn,
333
 or Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen. Amundsen was off on a 
lecture tour and did not participate in any of the preparations.
334
 That Amundsen was not 
involved in the planning of the expedition, and not present in any meaningful way, would 
have consequences for the expedition as a whole. 
The various versions of events are also apparent in the decision to use an airship for the 
expedition. There is a consensus on the importance of Nobile and the airship the Italian state 
possessed, but how he was contacted and why, varies. The differences may at first appear 
trivial, but they show that there are still uncertainties regarding what happened and why. 
These uncertainties also open up the area for more research. The literature on can be divided 
into five main categories describing what happened and why. 
First is the official account of the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight. The account 
states that before the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight’s take-off in 1925, the expedition 
participants had decided that they were to attempt the pole by airship in 1926 and would 
consider the 1925 expedition as a reconnaissance mission. It was also claimed that Hjalmar 
Riiser-Larsen had met Nobile and informed and convinced the rest of the expedition at 
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Spitsbergen, prior to take off, to contact Nobile on their return and use his airship.
335
 This 
view can also be found in Fartherst North
336
 and Kåre Berg’s Polarheltene,337 both of which 
largely base their conclusions on Amundsen’s official version. 
Second are the accounts from the biographers Bomann-Larsen and Wisting, who claim that 
Amundsen knew of Nobile, met him in Italy and test flew-the airship that later became the N1 
Norge.
338
  
Third is the modern historical research done by Roald Berg, who claims that there was a 
choice involved, and that Amundsen looked at the available modes of transportation and made 
a choice after the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight to disregard both a larger airplane and a 
giant Zeppelin. In Berg’s opinion, Amundsen preferred a smaller Italian airship.339 
Fourth is the account that came from Odd Arnesen, a journalist from Aftenposten, who claims 
that Amundsen needed a piece of technology, namely an airship with a crew, and found and 
bought it in Italy. Arnesen does not consider any other options nor mention any.
340
  
The fifth and certainly most common version is represented by Steinar Aas
341
, who skips the 
problem altogether and begin his account after Nobile has arrived in Norway. It can be found 
in most books that give an account of the last of Roald Amundsen’s expeditions, including 
international literature such as Airships in international affairs.
342
  
There does not appear to be significant differences between the accounts, but they become 
apparent as one look at the different accounts in view of their origin and use of sources. 
Amundsen’s official account was written in 1927, while he was in hostile litigation with 
Norsk Luftseiladsforening and open conflict with Nobile. As such, his book must be 
considered part of that process, and any statement of who knew whom, must be considered 
unreliable. Neither Bomann-Larsen nor Wisting describe the source where it is stated that 
Amundsen knew and had met Nobile, which opens the question to speculation, did Amundsen 
really know Nobile? Odd Arnesen’s type of account appears immediately after the expedition 
was completed, and was written as homage to Amundsen and as a defence against the Italian 
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propaganda usage of the expedition. The Aas type of approach does not take into account the 
complicated situation that existed and why the choice fell on Nobile, and as such it is not able 
to clarify that point. Berg appears as the one of few authors who are able or willing to show 
where the evidence can be found in archival sources.  
The different types of account show that depending on motive, perspective and sources, it is 
difficult to state factually something as trivial as how one central figure knew another central 
figure. What other and more important subjects have been treated in a similar manner? There 
is no consensus on details and nuance, and this opens the subject for further research. 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile expedition was facing fierce competition, as Time Magazine 
stated that at the time, eleven expeditions had plans to reach the North Pole.
343
 Time Magazine 
cites Amundsen as claiming that any new airplane expeditions had a one in 1500 chance to 
succeed, but that his airship expedition had a 100 per cent chance of success.
344
 The 
competitors also involved a number of well-known figures, including Fridtjof Nansen, who 
had joined forces with the German Zeppelin company through the scientific organization 
Aeroarctic. The Americans were also planning to use their airship Shenandoah in an 
expedition to the North Pole led by Admiral Moffett. The British also planned an expedition 
with their airship R34. The only nation available that had not scheduled an expedition was 
Italy, which happened to have a finished airship, N1. Formally, it belonged to the Italian king 
Emanuel III. The airship’s constructor was Umberto Nobile,345 working in Fascist Italy. 
Airships were uncommon and possessed symbolic value as items of prestige and symbols of 
national progress. Very few nations had the economy and resources to acquire an airship. 
Airships catered to governments and had, in their day and age, strategic value as military 
assets. As such, they were objects that were politically sensitive. In comparison, Germany was 
forced to cease constructing airships as part of its forced de-militarization after the defeat in 
the First World War. Airships were targeted because of their use in strategic bombing.
346
 
Italy, which had been a part of the Entente, was still able to produce these giants. That A/S 
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Roald Amundsen Polflyvning 1925 was allowed to buy one on behalf of Roald Amundsen 
may indicate that on a symbolic level, Amundsen was sufficiently influential to acquire a 
strategic military and cultural-political resource cheaply from a head of state, Benito 
Mussolini.  
Amundsen contacted Nobile on 15 July and arrived in Norway on 25 July 1925. The new 
expedition was planned at a meeting in the NFL, where Nobile was invited. He was to work 
with Amundsen, Arnold Ræstad, and Riiser-Larsen. The goal of the expedition is found in a 
letter from Ræstad to a bank, the Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse. In this letter, Ræstad 
describes that they intend to acquire an Italian navy airship from the Italian government. The 
plan called for the airship to be under the command of an Italian airship pilot, with a partially 
Italian crew. Most of the crew would be Norwegian, and the airship would fly under the 
Norwegian flag. The cost was estimated to NOK 1,850,000. The possible income was 
estimated to NOK 2,300,000.
347
 In order to fund this venture, it was decided that the profit 
from the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight, an estimated sum of about NOK 500,000, would 
be transferred to the new expedition, which was given the temporary name the Amundsen-
Ellsworth Transpolar Flight. This financial estimate, made in August 1925, was found to be 
faulty in December 1925, as the surplus of the Amundsen-Ellsworth Transarctic Flight was in 
fact only NOK 60,000.
 348
 With regard to the planned airship expedition, the accountant going 
through the books of the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight cautioned the board with the 
following words: ”Since this whole affair represents a large economic responsibility and will 
stand or fall with the outcome of the expedition, I will insist on advising the largest possible 
caution with the company funds.”349  
The act of using the profits from one expedition to fund another also had the implication that 
the contracts concerning the sharing of profits and the previously agreed-upon job 
designations could and would be left unchanged.
350
 Lincoln Ellsworth donated USD 100,000 
to the expedition, but not until he had made some demands. His full demands were: (1) that 
the expedition be called the Amundsen-Ellsworth Transarctic Flight, (2) that it should only 
carry only the Norwegian flag, (3) that he should be the only American aboard, (4) that the 
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final published material from the expedition was to be written by himself and Amundsen, (5) 
that his official connection and responsibility should be clearly defined,
351
 and (6) that he 
would choose the American newspaper that would receive the right to publish news from the 
expedition – the New York Times. In the end, only the first, third and sixth terms were met.352  
The clause regarding Ellsworth’s responsibilities entailed that his contract was changed so 
that he would be the scientific leader and navigator. Originally, the plans called for using Leif 
Dietrichson as the actual navigator, but giving Ellsworth the credit. Dietrichson did not agree 
to this. He left or was forced to leave the expedition. He was afraid that all credit related to his 
work would go to Ellsworth in the case of a success, and that undue fault would fall on him in 
the case of a crash.
353
 In either case, the move did not make the news. Berg finds it less than 
probable that Dietrichson left the expedition due to “family considerations,”354 as was the 
official explanation. 
Any profits from the expedition were to be divided according to the old contracts. The 
agreement was finalized at a meeting in the NLF on 15 August 1925. The stock company was 
also expanded to include future expeditions of Amundsen, and was renamed A/S Amundsen–
Ellsworth polflyvning 1925.
355
 At 1 September 1925, the Italian government sold the airship 
to NLF.
356
 The two men signing the contract were Benito Mussolini and Roald Amundsen. 
The dictator Mussolini had made himself Air Marshal at the time, and his first official act in 
that role was to sell N1 to Amundsen.
357
 The involvement of Mussolini would later have a 
major political impact on the expedition. Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen presented the expedition’s 
official plans to the NLF at a general assembly held on 9 September, as Amundsen was not 
well and Ellsworth was in the USA.
358
 
Rolf Thommessen was responsible for negotiating all the press rights and publishing rights. 
On 25 September 1925, Thommessen received a telegram informing him that the New York 
Times was willing to buy the exclusive rights for both North and South America for USD 
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55,000 (NOK 248,000). 
359
 According to Thommessen, this was a record sum, only beaten by 
Richard Evelyn Byrd’s record sum of USD 65,000 for his flight to the North Pole.360 It is 
interesting that The New York Times considered an expedition to the North Pole such a good 
story that they were willing to pay USD 130,000 to make sure that they had the exclusive 
rights to the story in the USA. The contract stated that Amundsen and Ellsworth would submit 
three articles, one about the plan, a second on the preparations and a third from the journey. 
Also, the expedition would carry a reporter who would service all contracts. This journalist 
had to be approved by the NLF, and would send his news to the NLF, who would then 
distribute them to their customers simultaneously.
 361
 The New York Times agreed to this, and 
stated that the first third of the payment would arrive when they signed a contract, the second 
when the airship reached Spitsbergen and the last instalment when the airship reached 
Alaska.
362
 The contracts were then drawn up and examined by Amundsen and Ellsworth (who 
were in the States), and if they approved, they would be cabled to Norway for approval by 
Thommessen, as legal entity.
363
 By 26 October 1925, the contracts were en-route in the mail, 
ready to be signed and approved. 
While the American news rights were sold quite quickly, there was considerably more 
difficulty in finding anyone willing to buy the British rights. The North American Newspaper 
Alliance was tasked with selling the rights for Norsk Luftseiladsforening, and the man given 
this job was Hayden Church. Church had been asked to find a buyer for news from the 
expedition, at a price of GBP 4,000 (NOK 109,000), and made his inquiries in October and 
November 1925. Church believed that only seven newspapers had the finances to be able to 
buy the story, and these were all asked: The Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, 
Westminister Gazette, Daily News, Daily Express, and Daily Chronicle. Church informed 
Thommessen that it had turned into a tough sell, as he writes: 
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(…) the “Daily mail”, had previously told me on several occasions that he [the editor] and his associates 
have a low opinion of Amundsen’s personal character, and he reiterated their lack of confidence in 
Amundsen when I [Church] saw him on Friday last. (…)364 
Some newspapers were not interested in Amundsen’s story, such as the Daily Telegraph, who 
did not even want to place a bid
365
, and the Daily Mail, was not interested and thought the 
price asked was “out of the question”366. Most papers asked told Church that the price was too 
steep for any single newspaper. Church agrees to this in his letter to Thommessen. In a letter 
from The Times to Church, he was informed by the Managing Editor that the newspaper was 
not interested in a GBP 4,000 deal, they would only consider a syndicated offer.
367
 This 
would allow the papers to lessen their risk and economic burden by pooling together the fee 
asked. And this was indeed how the British rights were sold. The news rights in Great Britain 
and Ireland were sold to the United Newspapers (1918) Ltd for GBP 2,500,
368
 which was 
NOK 62,500
369
, a considerable sum of money, but not as high as the GBP 4,000 originally 
asked of the individual papers. 
The North American Newspaper Alliance was also instrumental in selling the rights of the 
news to newspapers in continental Europe. The Alliance acted as an agent and gave the story 
for “free” (USD 1.00 was needed to make a legal contract) to members of the alliance, and 
sold the story to other newspapers. The sum raised by selling the news to European 
newspapers in this manner was about USD 8,750.
370
 Sweden, Denmark and Finland raised 
USD 4,000, and continental Europe raised the remaining USD 4,750. It was a considerable 
sum, but still no more than a little over half of the minimum estimated in advance.
371
 
Thommessen was the man in charge of the Norwegian contracts. There are no written or 
signed traces of the contracts with Norwegian newspapers in any part of the NLF archive. 
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Similarly, no statement evidence exists of what A/S Roald Amundsen-Ellsworth polflyvning 
1925 made from selling the contracts in Norway. Indirect estimates can be based on a 
statement that one quarter of the amount from Norway was NOK 10,000. This implies that 
they managed to extract NOK 40,000 from the Norwegian newspapers.
372
 It might also mean 
that they hoped to extract said sum from Norway. The only available “contract” is a series of 
letters between the NLF and the newspaper Ofoten Tidende, which was to pay NOK 300 for 
the media coverage in both Ofoten Tidende and Fremover. One set of photographs were sent 
to both newspapers, the pre-made stories were sent in duplicate and the telegrams with the 
latest developments were forwarded from another paper, Nordland, to keep the cost at an 
absolute minimum. This arrangement was the cheapest one available, as both papers only had 
two issues weekly and did not have the opportunity to profit from the news.
373
 In total, the 
media bought news from the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Expedition at a value of 
about USD 86,500, or NOK 390,000. This figure may be higher or lower. 
Fredrik Ramm was once again hired as the official Norwegian correspondent aboard the 
airship, writing the news that the NLF was going to sell on behalf of A/S Amundsen-
Ellsworth Polflyvning 1925. His wage was increased to NOK 800 a month, with free travel 
and board.
 374
 His task was to write the articles about the expedition in order to fulfil the 
contracts and deliver the news that the NLF had sold the rights to, to the world media. His 
stories would form the basis for the media’s depiction of the expedition. 
The New York Times was worried about their rival, The North American Newspaper Alliance 
(Alliance), who had bought the European rights. The New York Times feared that the Alliance 
would use their European rights in North and South America, including the USA, and break 
the monopoly bought by the New York Times. Thus, they insisted that all news were to be 
written in code, to which one of their correspondents had the key, so that their rivals, 
including the North American Newspaper Alliance, could not intercept news of the 
expedition.
375
 Thommessen sent his code to New York, where the Editor-in-Chief was able to 
study it. He replied to Thommessen that the Norwegian code was “dangerous”, as it was too 
complicated and intricate, so the New York Times would only allow the use of the code 
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employed by his own correspondent, COALTAR, which was simple, but sturdy. The 
Norwegians stated that they found it “weak”.376 How the media was engaged in fierce 
competition to publish first, and exclusively, is evidenced not only by the intense discussions 
about codes, but also from two other incidents. The first was an attempt by the United Press, 
which wished to break the monopoly on information by sending a correspondent to Kings 
Bay. His job was to report what he saw and heard to the Associated Press. People could not be 
stopped from entering Spitsbergen, but their transmissions could be stopped. The Associated 
Press was denied the use of the Kings Bay wireless transmitter and radio.
377
 The Associated 
Press protested on the exclusiveness of the news monopoly in an appeal to the Norwegian 
Minister H.H. Bryn
378
, who then suggested that the Norwegian government should spread the 
news to all correspondents, regardless of contractual agreements.
379
 This in turn made the 
New York Times react. It claimed that such an arrangement would render any future 
cooperation between press and Norwegian expeditions impossible. Without exclusive rights, 
the press would refuse to support the expeditions through contracts, as these would be unable 
to render any return on their investments.
380
 The NLF protested against this proposal, with the 
result that the Norwegian government did not allow anyone to use their wireless transmitters 
to “steal” the exclusive rights of the New York Times and the North American Newspaper 
Alliance.
381
 A media monopoly was established and the Norwegian government was involved 
in its protection. 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight had 70 members directly involved when it 
left Norway. It was the largest aeronautical expedition attempted at the time. The scale and 
scope of the logistics were massive. The site where the expedition was to be based was a 
mining facility at Kings Bay, now Ny Ålesund. The mining facility belonged to the 
Norwegian government, which owned Kings Bay Kul Compani A/S.
382
. Everything needed 
for the expedition had to be transported to this remote mining outpost at almost 80° North. 
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Nothing could be left to fate or chance, and everything had to be planned in advance. 
Correspondence from the NLF to various others indicate that the organization spent a 
considerable amount of manpower on acquiring information of what was available at Kings 
Bay and what could be borrowed, bought on site or had to be brought. Even the availability of 
electric power was a problem, as the expedition had to hire men to operate the local power 
plant.
383
 Those who would build the hangar for the airship needed accommodation, food, 
communication and equipment, and everything had to be planned in advance. When the last 
ship left Kings Bay in the autumn, the area was completely isolated, a virtual Arctic prison. 
The hangar for the airship, an essential building, was to be constructed by master carpenter 
F.R. Arild. He and a crew of 22 men were to build the hangar at Kings Bay between October 
1925 and April 1926.
384
 All the signed contracts include a clause on the importance of secrecy 
and that no member was allowed to speak of any events until two years after the expedition’s 
completion. The cost of the project was estimated to NOK 270,000.
385
 The work party left 
Trondheim on 14 October 1925, aboard the Alekto.
386
 As work progressed, Arild sent coded 
messages from Spitsbergen to Oslo with status updates and weather reports.
387
 By 18 April 
1926, all work on both the hangar and a mooring mast were complete.
388
  
When spring arrived, a whole new logistical job had to be done. This included shipping over 
1,100 metric tons of goods from Italy to Norway with the ship Vaga, including mooring 
masts, 6,300 steel bottles of hydrogen gas, and 100 crates of machine goods.
389
 The ship was 
also to carry 15 tons of sailcloth that was going to form the side cover and wind shield for the 
airship hangar. 
The polar film for the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight was also a responsibility 
of Thommessen. Based on their earlier cooperation, J.Chr. Gundersen was again used to sell 
the polar film for NLF. Both parties signed a contract giving Gundersen the world rights for 
the movie, awarding the NLF 70% of the income and Gundersen 30%, identical to the terms 
for the previous expedition film. Pathé contacted the NLF at an early stage, claiming that in 
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order to ensure good sales, it was important to release a film as close to the finish as possible. 
Pathé also informed the expedition that they were willing to buy the rights to the polar film 
for USD 5.00 for each foot of film used, which would amount to about USD 30,000
390
 for the 
planned film.
391
  
Nothing else seems to have been done until a telegram arrived from Pathé News stating that it 
wished to merge the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight film footage with that of 
Commander Byrd’s film footage (Pathé had exclusive rights) of his North Pole flight.392 Pathé 
writes that such an action would remove competition and create one grand film which would 
“(…) insure tremendous business and maximum results to you (…).”393 The response from 
Oslo was that they would not accept a deal without a minimum cash amount, paid up-front.
394
 
Amundsen and Ellsworth sent a telegram where they expressed that they considered it 
“unwise to negotiate with others”.395 Then, Thommessen informed Pathé that they could not 
combine the movie with Byrd’s footage, as Amundsen and Ellsworth opposed it.396 Pathé then 
offered to use two reels of film from the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight as a 
separate news feature
397
, to which Thommessen replied that they only wanted to sell a feature 
film.
398
 This brought the negotiations to a halt, as it appears that the rights were sold to 
International Newsreel, according to a telegram sent by Pathé News to NLF.
399
 The movie 
itself did not manage to bring in any foreign sales, and there are no records of the polar film 
generating any income in Norway or abroad. That Byrd at the time was believed to have 
reached the pole first, and that Roald Amundsen and Ellsworth flatly refused to have their 
account used alongside Byrd’s account may have caused Amundsen and Ellsworth’s film to 
be overshadowed by Byrd’s achievement. It may well be that the insistence on a separate film 
had the unfortunate consequence that none wanted to buy it, as it was a tale of the second 
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best. It may also be possible that the negotiator played his hand poorly and let the guaranteed 
income drop, trying to get a higher amount of money for the film.  
In his litigation against Roald Amundsen, Thommessen claims that it was Amundsen who 
made the sale of the film difficult, because he used a copy of the film on a lecture tour in 
December 1926.
400
 But correspondence shows that the sale of the film floundered as early as 
May 1926. It appears improbable that Roald Amundsen’s actions six months later had any 
impact on the sales of a movie which international media considered uninteresting.  
Immediately before the expedition was to leave from Italy for the long trip to Spitsbergen, and 
due to some complications and demands from the Italians, the expedition was named the 
Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight. The change of name was a result of massive 
Italian political pressure on the NLF to make sure that the Italian contribution to the 
expedition was not ignored. The naming issue was considered controversial by some, as it 
appears that a faction within the expedition, fronted by Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, was opposed to 
a change of name and made preparations to continue the expedition without the Italians.
401
 
Thommessen stated in his account that he was afraid the Italian government might have 
broken their contract with the NLF and A/S Amundsen-Ellsworth polflyvning if the name had 
remained unchanged. “–Nobile “ was added to honour the designer, constructor and pilot 
Nobile, give recognition to the Italian state and to make sure that the words “American–
Italian–Norwegian” were kept out.402 Nobile was critical to the success of the expedition, a 
fact that could not be ignored, and it meant that Amundsen and Ellsworth, who did not know 
how to fly an airship, would have to share some prestige. The naming issue was finalized in 
Oslo on 16 March, when Amundsen, Thommessen, Ellsworth and Riiser-Larsen were present 
and went along with calling the expedition the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar 
Flight.
403
 
The name of the expedition was only one of several political implications. On 30 December 
1925, Thommessen received a note from the Norwegian foreign ministry informing him that 
it had received information that the Italians regarded their participation in the expedition as a 
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purely political matter, and that all decisions would have to be approved by the Italian 
government,
404
 in other words by Benito Mussolini.  
Thommessen wrote that all matters of importance for the expedition were to be approved by 
Mussolini himself. This peeled away layers of bureaucracy and put the expedition on the fast 
track. Furthermore, Mussolini’s involvement meant that Italy was willing to spend vast 
amounts of money on the expedition. The head of state’s involvement also generated 
increased pressure for results, and there was also pressure to make the Italian wishes more 
explicit in the expedition. According to Thommessen, Mussolini hampered Nobile in his work 
and made it more difficult for the NLF to negotiate, as every matter had to be brought before 
him before a decision could be made. Thommessen also noted that the Norwegian 
government considered the expedition to be irrelevant to its affairs.
405
 This statement may 
well reflect Thommessen’s manoeuvrings rather than an indication of the actual state of 
affairs. Thommessen had claimed that an expedition would have been impossible to arrange 
without the help of a state, such as Italy.
406
 The Norwegian government showed clear interest 
in the expedition through its donations. Moreover, Amundsen was instructed to claim any new 
land for the Norwegian crown. And of course, even if it was not directly sponsoring the 
expedition, the Norwegian government was certainly interested in having the flag prominently 
displayed over the Arctic, as further evidence of the nation’s role as a leading polar power. 
In order to understand this expedition and particularly its aftermath, it may be best to see it as 
two separate ventures: The first a Norwegian (propaganda) expedition to fly across the Arctic 
basin and reach the North Pole, led by Roald Amundsen. The second as an Italian propaganda 
expedition to the North Pole led by Mussolini, in which Amundsen was present, but did not 
do anything. The Italian government was very specific in its use of language when talking 
about the expedition. In documents from Italian officials, the expedition is called “Spedizione 
Italo-Norvegese al Polo Nord”, the Italian-Norwegian expedition to the North Pole.407 It 
might mean that there was a policy of referring to the expedition as Italian-Norwegian, rather 
than as Norwegian under the leadership of Roald Amundsen and Lincoln Ellsworth, or as the 
Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight.  
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The issue of naming and fronting of nationalities did not go unnoticed. In his book, which 
cannot be seen as impartial, Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen claims that the Italians had no knowledge 
of it being a Norwegian expedition, and that they considered it a purely Italian initiated and 
planned expedition, with a small contribution from Norwegians with polar experience.
408
 
Wisting also fronts this view in his biography on Amundsen.
409
 Wisting also makes a point of 
the political views of Mussolini and the Italian propaganda machinery on this issue, writing 
that the news of the expedition was followed with interest in “Little Italy” in New York, 
where it was known as an expedition with Roald Amundsen, led by Benito Mussolini.
410
 
Another indication that the Italians viewed the expedition as an Italian venture was that a 
Major Vallini, who was part of the expedition’s ground crew, praised the Italian part of the 
expedition and reduced the Norwegian involvement to almost nothing in a “tasteless and 
tactless” way in the newspaper Giornale d’Italia.411  
Another incident that shows the Italian view of the expedition occurred on 18
 
January, when 
Riiser-Larsen and Nobile left for Leningrad in the Soviet Union to negotiate with Soviet 
authorities on the use of an airship hangar where N1 Norge was to stay and wait for good 
weather conditions before flying to Svalbard. A letter from the negotiations confirms that the 
Norwegian foreign ministry feared that the Italians were using the expedition to further their 
own cause. When Riiser-Larsen arrived from Leningrad after negotiations with the Soviets, he 
informed the foreign ministry that the Italians were using the airship N1 Norge as an example 
of Italian industry and emphasized the Italian participation in the expedition. The Italians 
went so far as to object to the Norwegian consul’s presence at the negotiations with the 
Soviets.
412
 The fact remains that N1 Norge was a product of Italian industry, but both nations 
were equally eager to claim the credit for the expedition. 
The Norwegian cabinet kept a close watch on the developments in the Amundsen-Ellsworth-
Nobile Transpolar Flight, and reports were sent to the prime minister, Johan Ludwig 
Mowinckel, detailing the political and diplomatic views on the expedition and the impact it 
had on Norwegian-Italian relations.
413
 As mentioned earlier, the Italian government viewed 
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their involvement in the expedition as a political matter, and all decisions regarding the Italian 
part of the expedition were to be made by the government personified, Benito Mussolini.
414
 In 
Norway, this caused unease and forced a response, as the Norwegians were trying to 
minimize and reduce the visibility of the Italians. In a personal letter to Thommessen, a 
member of the Norwegian legation in Italy wrote that:  
During the preparations [for the expedition], it has become apparent that our cooperation with the 
Italians has developed into something far more substantial and active than had been foreseen when we 
started this venture. (...). In addition to the purely moral implications, the abovementioned has entailed 
both direct and indirect cooperation with the Italian government which, if translated to monetary value, 
would amount to accountable funds close to 3,000,000 lire. This is in addition to the funds stipulated in 
the contracts (…).
415
  
The contribution of the Italian government was far more extensive than the Norwegians had 
envisaged. Further, it is stated in the letter that Mr Vangensten of the Norwegian legation had 
done all he could to keep his official role out of his talks with the Italians, and that no content 
of his conversations with the Italians had been reported through official channels. His 
argument was that the Norwegian government had nothing to do with the expedition for 
political reasons: 
(…) especially that the Norwegian state and government have nothing to do with this venture, among 
other reasons in order to, if possible, slow down somewhat the Italian government’s rather aggressive 
assertion of the political momentum, that seen from a Norwegian standpoint, at least theoretically, is of 
no interest. 
416
  
The issue of allowing the Italians to drop a flag at the North Pole was yet another issue that 
made the Norwegians wince, as: ”As is known, last year Amundsen was under orders to, and 
had the necessary authority to claim any newly discovered land in the name of His Majesty 
the king of Norway; he is certain to receive the same orders this year.”417 Vangensten also 
makes a point of what the NLF had to do in order to make it clear that the expedition was to 
be considered Norwegian:  
(…) in my opinion, it is quite necessary that we, from the Norwegian point of view, systematically 
form a counterweight [to the Italian perspective] by tactfully attempting to use whatever means 
available to emphazise that the expedition is Amundsen’s and Norwegian by initiative and concerning 
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all essentials (...). I consider it absolutely necessary that Amundsen himself travel down here (...). At the 
first occassion possible, you should be present as well (...).
418
 (Underscoring in original letter).  
Vangensten also wrote that when the crew arrived in Italy for training, they too would be used 
in his plans to make the expedition more Norwegian:  
(…) they [the crew] will not be allowed to hide; on the contrary, they will be ”put on display” (...), 
“become fashionable” here and thus be utilized for propaganda purposes, not only for the polar flight, 
but also for Norway in general.
419
 (Quotation marks from original letter).  
Vangensteen writes that he had been very busy in his attempts to silently counteract the 
Italians’ political moves. He also made it very clear that any negotiations he was to be 
involved in had to be verbal only, so that no written accounts could be misused if they ended 
up in the wrong hands.
420
  
Another Italian act was a wish to exchange honorary medals. Thommessen did what he could 
to persuade the Norwegian government to accept such a move, but the prime minister did not 
wish to do such a thing, and the master of ceremonies was appalled when he heard that the 
NLF had nominated Mussolini for a Royal Norwegian order of St. Olav in gold. Thommessen 
wrote to Vangensten that he also had to get a medal for Lincoln Ellsworth, as:  
As you know, he has granted USD 100,000 to the new expedition, and is furthermore its official leader 
along with Amundsen, and in every respect he is to be considered a gentleman, even though his 
importantce, disregarding his large monetary contribution, is naturally quite limited.
421
  
No medals were exchanged, as the Italians were slowly convinced that the expedition was a 
private affair arranged by Roald Amundsen and the NLF. 
A later letter from Vangensten, sent through official channels in order to keep it secret, 
stressed the importance of “keeping the Italians from being equals in the expedition”, as this 
would be disastrous for the Norwegian character of the expedition,
422
 part of the disaster 
being that an Italian expedition leader would have the authority to change the goal and the 
character of the expedition. Indeed, this had been one of the Italians’ original demands, as 
they wanted Nobile to be the leader of the expedition while it was airborne, and for him to 
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have the power to turn the expedition around at the North Pole if he so chose.
423
 Amundsen 
and Ellsworth flatly refused this, and Thommessen and NLF agreed.  
It appears as NLF and Amundsen had entered into an agreement with the Italian government 
that was both naive and opportunistic. It appears as likely that Mussolini may have seen the 
combination of a known polar explorer and symbolic Italian airship as an invitation to make a 
propaganda coup, rather than a friendly gesture to help Roald Amundsen achieve his goals. 
When the contracts had been signed, and the consequences became apparent, it may be 
possible that members of the Norwegian government noticed this as a possible 
embarrassment, and took steps to minimize their risk by for instance refusing to exchange 
medals. The continuous Norwegian steps to reduce the visibility of the Italians appear to be 
motivated by the consequences of what they should have assumed from the start, that the 
expedition was not a way for Mussolini to become friendly with Amundsen.  
The Norwegian Storting did show interest in the expedition. The navy ship Farm was at 
Amundsen’s disposal during the summer of 1926, documents at the Storting show that funds 
were made available to pay for the crew and “manoeuvres”, as had been done in 1925,424 and 
the ships Heimdal and Michael Sars were supposed to be made available to the expedition, 
according to Stortingsmelding nr. 16, 1926. One of the reasons listed was that the expedition 
had a national character and that the cost of the support would be minimal, as the ships were 
supposed to be in the area at the time anyway.
425
 The cost of helping Amundsen with two 
ships would be tiny, claimed the committee responsible, and a unanimous Storting, without 
any debate, approved the proposal.
426
  
According to Thommessen’s account, the government support with ships was also made 
available in order to make sure that the Italians did not send a warship to Spitsbergen to 
support the expedition, which would have been damaging to the Norwegian character of the 
expedition.
427
 Small favours and help from lower level officials were also a part of the 
political wish to further the Norwegian cause through a successful Roald Amundsen. The 
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NLF had asked the government if they could continue their tax agreement from 1924.
428
 As 
during the expedition in 1925, the 1926 expedition was given the right to import goods and 
foodstuffs duty-free, as long as it was properly marked as property of the expedition. This was 
ordered by the government in a resolution made on 29
 
October 1925.
429
  
The Norwegian government also allowed the expedition to borrow equipment. The Maud 
expedition had borrowed all its weapons and ammunition from the Norwegian army. When 
the NLF asked if it could borrow weapons
430
 for the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar 
Flight in February 1926, it was at originally refused because the weapons borrowed to the 
Maud expedition, or Roald Amundsen personally, had never been returned. Only when those 
weapons were returned would the army reconsider lending them weapons.
431
 In theory, the 
NLF had nothing to do with the Maud expedition, but it did not take long before the missing 
weapons were returned, except those who were in the possession of expedition members 
Tessem and Knudsen when they disappeared.
432
 Other items borrowed from the army 
included floodlights and searchlights that would be used in case it was dark when N1 Norge 
arrived.
433
 Sleeping mats, clothing and blankets for most of those affiliated with the 
expedition were also borrowed from the army.
434
  
The department of defence also helped the expedition secure permissions to fly across the 
airspace of the nations in the planned flight path. The airship was given instructions that 
certain areas were no fly zones, while others were no photography zones, as the borders in 
1920’s Europe were mostly military no go zones. The department of defence formally 
allowed Nobile to fly N1 Norge in Norway for three months.
435
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An important example of small favours done by the government and its officials was that the 
registration number of N1 Norge was supposed to be N28, as in N28 Norge. But someone had 
informed the NLF that the Norwegian registration number N1 was available, and it was 
assigned to the airship.
436
 This also allowed the expedition to save funds, as the number 
written on the airship in large letters did not have to be changed.  
A political issue arose with respect to the high number of personnel holding military rank 
involved in the project. A diplomat in Great Britain raised questions with regard to the 
numerous men aboard holding military ranks and the nature of the flag N1 Norge flew under. 
The response from the NLF claims that N1 Norge flew under a merchant flag, and that all 
men aboard who held a military rank, were on unpaid leave from the military service and 
were hired as civilians.
437
 This was true for the Norwegians, but not for the Italians. Nobile 
was not hired as a private person, but was ordered
438
 to work on N1 Norge as an Italian 
officer, and received salaries from both the expedition and the Italian government. All the 
Italian members of the expedition were active duty personnel that were paid both by the 
Italian government and by the expedition. 
The goal was to sail from Spitsbergen to the North Pole and continue to Nome in Alaska. The 
flags of all three nations were dropped on the Pole, and the act was painstakingly documented. 
On 17 May 1926, after an eventful journey, the airship landed at Teller, about 100 kilometres 
north of Nome, Alaska, where it was dismantled.  
The expedition itself was a success. In a news statement sent to the New York Times, it was 
described how people responded to the news, that the expedition was a success and what then 
happened in Oslo. It was written that when news reached Oslo that N1 Norge had been 
sighted from Point Barrow, a crowd that had gathered in Akersgaten erupted in “scenes of 
tumultuous excitement”439. Flags were hoisted, and thousands of issues of the extra 
newspaper editions were sold. Some even attempted to break into the printing shops to get a 
fresh copy. The following day it became apparent that the news from the previous day had 
been, fake and people were more reserved, but a crowd of hundreds had gathered in 
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Akersgaten nonetheless, asking all who came or went of news. When final confirmation came 
in the late afternoon of 18 May 1926, Tidens Tegn was the first to print it, and the special 
edition of the newspaper was sold out in minutes and “(…) even [office] staff [were] assisting 
street sale [in] order [to] satisfy everyone’s demand for news (…)”.440 So the news that 
Amundsen had finally reached the North Pole was major news in Norway, but it was believed 
internationally that Richard Byrd had been first.  
The Norwegian government 
showed its gratitude to the 
members of the expedition, 
as Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, 
Oscar Wisting and Oscar 
Omdal were all promoted by 
the Storting. The case of 
Riiser-Larsen became a 
political issue, as he was 
promoted on merits, which 
had never been done before 
in the Norwegian navy, and 
this caused immediate controversy. It was customary to promote a whole class at once. In the 
following debate, the prime minister, Mowinckel made it clear that the promotion was a sign 
of gratitude for his actions and his work. The Storting approved the motion.
441
 
The troubles between the members of the expedition came in stark contrast to the festivities 
held when Amundsen and Ellsworth arrived in Norway. The Norwegian (and American) 
members arrived in Oslo with the ship Stavangerfjord, and were formally received at 
Honnørbryggen (The Honorary Pier) by Oslo Kommune (Oslo County) and the city’s major 
and the president of the Storting. Afterwards, they were taken by horse and carriage to the 
royal palace, where they had an audience with His Majesty Haakon VII. The explorers were 
staying at the Grand Hotel. A dinner party in their honour was held at Bristol Hotel, at which 
the minister of defence held a speech. Meanwhile, a party was arranged by the 
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Fedrelandslaget at Akershus Festning (Akershus Fortress), where Fridtjof Nansen held a 
speech. 
While the Americans in the USA were still cheering their own hero, Byrd, who was at the 
time believed to be the first person to fly to the North Pole, one can say that the Norwegians 
and Italians, represented by Amundsen and Nobile, were locked in a battle for glory in the 
press.  
The aftermath of the expedition was not a success for any of the involved parties. The 
controversy has received considerable attention in the literature on the expedition. Bomann-
Larsen writes that Amundsen was the one who first breached the peace, as he and Ellsworth 
had to accept that Nobile had been made into a third leader of the expedition.
442
 Since no new 
land was discovered, most of the honour for a successful flight went to Nobile, who was the 
leader of the airship. Amundsen had considered the expedition a formality to get him to the 
pole.
443
 In Bomann-Larsen’s account, Roald Amundsen was an infuriated man who looked for 
an excuse to break the contract with the NLF, which indeed occurred on 29 July 1926.
444
  
Roald Berg views the trouble that lead to the break as underlying rivalries based in masculine 
honour,
445
 as Nobile was a competitor for the honour that should befall Roald Amundsen, and 
that this rivalry caused a clash of personalities.
446
 Amundsen broke with the NLF upon his 
return to Norway in August 1926 over an issue on some equipment that had been lent to the 
Italians.
447
 This led to the collapse of the NLF in January 1928.
448
 
Alexander Wisting dates the break differently, as he views the struggle as a result of 
ambiguous contracts, miscommunication and national pride.
449
 It appears difficult, if not 
impossible to put the finger on any specific person or act that led to the trouble. Much of the 
trouble that happened in the aftermath of the expedition came from the uncomfortable fact 
that the NLF was insolvent and owed a considerable amount of money to the Italian 
government, which may have used this debt as leverage. 
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According to the sales contract signed on 1 September 1925, Italy was bound to buy back N1 
Norge when the expedition was finished. These negotiations had collapsed, and Thommessen 
had to travel to Italy himself to negotiate. He managed to solve the problems, but he was 
forced to make concessions. The Italians were allowed to use the airship hangar at Kings Bay 
“free of charge” for an upcoming Italian expedition. In his account, Thommessen states that 
the loan of the hangar was not “free”, but that it was a way for the NLF to reduce their 
considerable debt to the Italian government.
450
  
Was his expedition made in the name of science or sensation? In a scientific journal, Lincoln 
Ellsworth claimed that the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight had scientific value, but he did 
not use the word science when he wrote his account of the journey with N1 Norge.
451
 
Likewise, Umberto Nobile does not mention science in his book My polar flights
452
, or in his 
contemporary articles “The dirigible and polar exploration”453 and “Navigating the “Norge” 
from Rome to the North Pole and Beyond” 454. Roald Amundsen mentions that the goal of the 
expedition was to explore the unknown, but he also states that he denied a scientist access to 
the expedition.
455
 The expedition appears to have had nothing to do with science, and 
scientists, it seems, were not welcome.  
In November 1926, when Nobile toured the USA on a mission from the Italian state, it was 
reported through diplomatic channels that Nobile had made several claims in his lectures, 
including that Mussolini had ordered the expedition, that the idea to use an airship to cross the 
pole had first come from the Italians, and that Amundsen had allegedly had an idea to this 
effect, but that his came after the Italians’. Nobile also claimed that the Italians were the key 
to the success of the expedition. Furthermore, he claimed that Ellsworth “and others” 
deserved credit, but that most should go to Mussolini.
456
 When Amundsen discovered that 
Nobile did a tour of the USA, he had himself and Ellsworth removed as honorary members of 
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the NLF. This caused Thommessen to publicly denounce the actions of Roald Amundsen as a 
breach of contract, and he used his paper Tidens Tegn to wage a front-page polemic 
discrediting Amundsen. Amundsen was then sued by the NLF for violating his contract. The 
polemic can be found in most papers in December 1926.  
The expedition was, at the same time, Amundsen’s life-goal achievement, his final 
expedition, and a way to show off Norway as a polar nation. But the expedition was much 
more: It entailed a union between media and expedition, as well as a resource for launching 
the new Italy through propaganda. Umberto Nobile’s achievement as a designer, builder and 
pilot of an airship across the world’s most inhospitable ocean was as much a part of the 
expedition as Amundsen’s narrowly focused aims. All these factors fed a sensation-hungry 
press with newsworthy material. At the time, it was the world’s most technologically 
sophisticated and expensive expedition. It reached its goals, but it failed to be remembered 
with dignity.  
The legal battle and the public dispute were never officially resolved. Roald Amundsen died 
in the Latham air crash during his own private rescue expedition to save Umberto Nobile after 
the airship Italia crashed northeast of Spitsbergen in 1928. At that time, the transpolar 
expedition had accumulated a debt of about NOK 638,000
457
, of which NOK 400,000 was 
never repaid. A/S Amundsen–Ellsworths polflyvning 1925 was liquidated and finally 
dissolved in 1933.
458
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5 
Roald Amundsen’s expeditions in the media and politics 
from Maud to N1 Norge 
During the Maud expedition, phase A, there appears to be no cooperation between the 
expedition and the media, but the media were positive in their coverage. Even the comic press 
was positive. Maud was initially launched with the intent to finalize the dream of reaching the 
North Pole by ship, the completion of Fridtjof Nansen’s scientific work and, as the magazine 
Exlex portrayed, to make Norway the only polar nation to have conquered both poles. 
Scientific research was the main focus of the expedition, and the “record” of the North Pole 
was only a secondary goal. The Norwegian government may have had an intent to fund the 
expedition to create a new national celebration such as had happened with Fram I. The 
government had interests in the Maud expedition, but due to the lack of debate, it is unclear 
how the Storting viewed the expedition in relation to Norwegian politics. The government 
granted funds for a support expedition to lay out depots on East Greenland in 1919, the Thule 
Expedition, and furbished Maud with unofficial support such as weapons borrowed from the 
army. It is not known whether the expedition borrowed other equipment, but it may be 
probable. The year Maud was launched also marked the year that Norwegian foreign policy 
overtly shifted towards expansion. The amount of support given to Maud can be interpreted as 
a sign that it was supported to further Norwegian interest in the Arctic, and possibly as a sign 
of intent of a Norwegian expansionist policy in the Arctic. The result of Maud was completely 
different, as it failed to accomplish any of the goals set out in 1918. Men had been lost, the 
crew left the expedition, but the details about how the expedition unravelled were kept away 
from the media.  
After the initial disappointments of the first phase of the expedition, the non-planned sailing 
through the Northeast Passage and refitting in port, phase B was launched in great haste. 
There is no evidence to indicate media involvement other than an appetite to report news from 
the expedition. What was written in the media conforms to what was reported on the 
expedition and what has later been written in history books. Nothing negative was hidden, and 
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although some of the press remained largely positive, such as Aftenposten, other parts of the 
press were negative, such as Dagbladet. This was especially true with regard to the comic 
press. The time lag between actual events and these events being reported in the Norwegian 
media caused confusion as reports from Maud, phase A were reported at the same time as 
Maud, phase B was launched. Although it was reported that much scientific data had been 
collected, there were no particularly newsworthy discoveries. Similarly there was not much to 
report in the way of sport or sensation. Maud, phase B was not involved in politics directly, 
and achieved nothing, but during the expedition, the Norwegian government secretly granted 
NOK 500,000 to the expedition as a whole. When Amundsen returned from Maud, phase B, 
and asked the Norwegian government for funds, these were used to finance Maud, phase C. 
This can be seen in two ways, that the Storting was uninterested in a debate, which might 
have been embarrassing, or the lack of discussion can be taken as a sign of confidence in 
Roald Amundsen. The expedition was saved by the grant of half a million kroner, which was 
commented on in Aftenposten, criticized in Dagbladet, and made fun of in the comic press.  
Amundsen abandoned the Maud expedition as it entered phase C; the expedition continued 
under the command of Oscar Wisting. There was cooperation between the media and Maud, 
phase C. But the sums involved were small (NOK 14,000), and compared to the direct 
government funding (NOK 700,000) it cannot be called a commercial expedition. It can be 
claimed that the Maud, phase C initiated contractual cooperation between media and 
expedition. Having bought rights to news coverage, the involved media then tended to publish 
primarily positive accounts, in contrast to media that had not entered into cooperation. This 
positive coverage may have been influenced by the fact that the source of negative news, 
Roald Amundsen, was no longer present aboard. Maud, phase C was a scientific exploratory 
expedition funded mostly by government money with the intent of completing the work of 
Nansen and indirectly furthering the cause of the Norwegian policy of Arctic expansion. The 
result was an expedition that was aborted, but which returned home with a substantial amount 
of scientific data from the Arctic, that subsequently was published as part of Norway’s 
significant contributions to polar research. 
The Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight was launched in tandem with Maud, phase C and did 
not achieve anything in relation to the goal that the name implies, namely an airplane 
expedition across the Arctic basin. The expedition was the beginning of the cooperation 
between explorer and media, which in turn resulted in news coverage slanted with a positive 
and sensational twist. Amundsen of course disappointed his supporters, but criticism came 
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mostly from Dagbladet and the comic press, who were not part of the cooperation between 
media and the explorer.  
The union between the expedition and the media also led to other problems, namely that the 
“truth” of what happened was dictated by Roald Amundsen, as other sources were deemed 
unreliable or as outright rumours. Neither critics nor those who cooperated sent their own 
correspondent along to the expedition site and as a result, literature and media are in 
agreement on what happened because in the end, the source for both was Roald Amundsen’s 
personal account. The litigation letter from John M. Larsen provides a counter story; one with 
a more complete picture. Larsen’s account shows that uncomfortable facts were disregarded 
in the news from Amundsen, which was taken as unproblematic truth. 
The political opinion is not clear on the Maud Expedition Transarctic Flight, as the 
Norwegian Storting did not have a debate on the safety-expedition for Roald Amundsen, but 
donated NOK 60,000 without debate. That the government issued the funds and launched an 
expedition to provide rescue assistance does show an interest in the safety of the expedition. 
The choice to cancel the expedition resulted in consequences later. That the expedition failed, 
was a setback for Roald Amundsen, but the political expansion into the Arctic had taken on a 
life of its own, and in 1923 plans to bring Svalbard under Norwegian control were well under 
way, and the popular movement to acquire Greenland was gaining momentum. 
In contrast to the ship-based Maud expedition, it became apparent during the Maud 
Expedition Transarctic Flight that Roald Amundsen was not critical to the completion of the 
expedition. Larsen made the machines, and the one who could make them work and fly, was 
Oscar Omdal. The knowledge and know-how possessed by Roald Amundsen, which had been 
so important earlier, would increasingly become superfluous as compared with the knowledge 
and skills possessed by Omdal. Amundsen’s skills of planning and logistics could not prevent 
a dismal failure. 
The Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight was the first of two expeditions for which the media 
and expedition cooperated so closely that it can be called a protocooperation. Tidens Tegn and 
the expedition stock company were virtually administered by the same staff. What was 
printed in the media, which also shaped public opinions on the expedition, was mostly written 
by NLF’s own correspondent, Fredrik Ramm, or based on his writings. A direct result of this 
cooperation was that Roald Amundsen’s expeditions received almost uniform positive 
coverage in the media. That the expedition was a failure seems to have been ignored by the 
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national media, and that Amundsen was an employee, although an important one, of a 
company that used his name and hero status, was kept hidden. Foreign media were more sober 
in their coverage of the expedition. Hvepsen, as one of a few members of the comic press, 
remained sceptical. 
When viewed in light of the Maud expedition, the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight was not 
related to science. The expedition was dominated by sensation, and was focused on 
accumulating as large funds as possible in order to fund a larger and grander expedition.  
There appears to be a consensus in literature and sources that Roald Amundsen was not 
critical for the operations of the Amundsen-Ellsworth Polar Flight, as his skills were not 
needed. The mechanics and pilots proved critical for the operation of the airplanes and for 
bringing them back safely. Planning and logistics as well as the safe return was done by NLF. 
Amundsen was important to the initiation of the expedition, moreover his name, his symbolic 
status and his fame opened doors that would otherwise have remained closed.  
Rolf Thommessen may have profited from the cooperation with Roald Amundsen as editor of 
Tidens Tegn. Additionally, he might have been able to use the intense popularity of Roald 
Amundsen to further his own agenda as a member of a political lobby group working to make 
Greenland a Norwegian domain. The Norwegian Storting may also have had its own agenda. 
Leading members of the political leadership of Norway wanted to support the expedition and 
use it to further their own agendas, namely to reinforce at home and abroad the image of 
Norway as a leading polar nation, based on the courage and will-power of its manly polar 
heroes. As such, highly-visible polar exploits that captured media and public attention 
indirectly served as a form of legitimizing the expansion into the Arctic and also to further 
what was a national policy and was beginning to turn into a tradition. Norway was expanding 
into the Arctic, and the support for the expedition was a national political issue which 
determined the role of Norway in international affairs. In the eyes of the Prime Minister 
Mowinckel, Roald Amundsen was virtually one with the Norwegian people, and highly 
visible as a beacon of what Norway wanted to be and achieve in international affairs. The 
government may have had an intent to support Roald Amundsen in order to be able to use 
Amundsen’s actions to demonstrate that Norway had interests in the Arctic and Greenland, 
and as a way to show that Norway had a tradition of being a polar nation, in essence 
demonstrating continuity. The expansive Norwegian foreign policy not only represented a 
long-term trend for Norway, the polar nation, but also the beginning of Norway as a polar 
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imperialist. By finally speaking out in a debate, the Norwegian Storting set a course for 
Norway in the Arctic which would have future consequences, such as the Greenland issue 
with Denmark, which was the peak of what has been termed the Norwegian polar 
imperialism. 
During the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight, the media cooperation was even 
tighter than before, it was a protocooperation. The arrangement resulted in virtually the same 
text being published not only in the Oslo papers, but also in major newspapers throughout 
Norway, Europe and the USA. The material was positive towards the expedition and 
nationalistic in essence. It was printed in the hope that it would increase circulation, which 
was a way to increase sales on advertisements. The expedition was a union between media 
and expedition, a fusion of sensation and achievement, a capital-intensive investment. The 
newspapers did not criticize Roald Amundsen or his expedition while the expedition lasted. 
The media were dominantly positive during the transpolar expedition, as most leading papers 
in Norway had made an investment into the expedition and received ready-to-print news from 
the expedition. It can be argued that the media were losing its objective character and became 
a medium for patriotic propaganda and hero worship, which makes the use of the media as a 
source of information increasingly meaningless. The apparent exception was Hvepsen from 
the comic press, which was not part of the arrangement. When the expedition was formally 
finished, the press, both Norwegian and international, became a battleground between various 
factions within the expedition. These fought over honour, rights and money, with the result 
that none was retained by either. The massive negative press coverage and polemic in the 
papers after the expedition was a public relations disaster for all parties involved, and led to 
controversies that are yet to be resolved. 
Amundsen’s last expedition was not connected to scientific work at all, and no account from 
the members of the expedition mentions that the goal of the expedition was scientific. It 
appears as though the word was not used in relation to the expedition at all, which is in stark 
contrast to Maud, where science was paramount. The goal was to reach the North Pole and 
continue on to Alaska. They were the first to travel the shortest distance between Europe and 
America. The expedition entailed sport and records; sensation with respect to the goal and the 
means of achieving it, that is a technological symbol of progress and modernity. 
Roald Amundsen was not present during most of the preparations for the expedition. He was 
occupied with various work in the United States, working to raise funds. Others had become 
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critical, such as Umberto Nobile, Rolf Thommessen, and Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen. Amundsen 
joined the expedition at Kings Bay in Spitsbergen; 72 hours later he had achieved his goal. He 
was a leader aboard, but had no task other than sitting and observing. Roald Amundsen had 
become redundant in his own expedition. Those who appear to have been most important 
were NLF, represented by Rolf Thommessen, Umberto Nobile, as designer, constructor and 
pilot, the Fascist state Italy for the considerable support, and Lincoln Ellsworth for his cash 
donations.  
It was during the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar flight that Roald Amundsen was 
used to further a number of causes simultaneously. In literature and the contemporary media, 
Amundsen is portrayed as heading a Norwegian expedition that was helped by the Norwegian 
government, which did what it could to make the expedition appear as Norwegian as possible. 
At the same time, the Italian government saw its assistance to the expedition as a political 
issue which went to the highest authority, Benito Mussolini himself. Mussolini used the 
Italian involvement in the expedition for propaganda purposes, trying to promote Fascist Italy 
and Italian industrial products. N1 Norge was that industrial product, but at the same time it 
was a symbol of progress and the spirit of the futurism so popular in Fascist Italy. In Italy, the 
expedition was seen as Italian, but with Norwegian helpers. The assistance from the Italian 
government proved to be substantial, as the expedition ended and the sums that Benito 
Mussolini and his state had allowed to be used on the expedition, became apparent. This 
support may have been used to force concessions from NLF, Thommessen and others. In sum, 
both the Norwegian and the Italian government celebrated and magnified Amundsen and his 
expedition to further their own agendas. Thommessen may also have used the expedition to 
further his organization NLF, his newspaper Tidens Tegn, and his lobby group which had the 
explicit goal of claiming Greenland for Norway. Thommessen and his daily paper Tidens 
Tegn had an advantage due the cooperation, as Tidens Tegn was the nexus from which all 
information flowed. It was the paper with the best opportunity to capitalize on the Amundsen-
Ellsworth-Nobile Transpolar Flight. The cooperation between the media and the expedition 
was so close that it became a defining trait of the expedition.  
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Conclusion 
The expeditions from Maud to N1 Norge became increasingly dependent upon the media. The 
close linkage and mutual reliance of the expeditions and the media on each other for attaining 
their respective goals evolved into a protocooperation. This intimate relationship also resulted 
in the involved media becoming increasingly less objective in their reporting and increasingly 
less willing to cast a negative or critical perspective on Amundsen’s exploits. Those 
newspapers involved with formal cooperation emerged as organs for propaganda for 
Norwegian patriot hero-worship. The Maud expedition began as a scientific endeavour for 
which the Norwegian state contributed as part of its accepted obligation to increase the 
knowledge of the Arctic for all of civilization. Of course idealism went hand in hand with 
more real political ambitions for Norway to establish itself as a major polar nation able to 
justify its territorial desires through its willingness and ability to contribute to understanding 
nature in the extreme north. The expedition never achieved its goals, but is remembered for its 
scientific work. The later expeditions of Roald Amundsen were not related to science, and 
were increasingly devoted to sensation for funds and to sport as achievement. Amundsen also 
became less important to the execution of his own expeditions, but he was important for their 
initiation. The name and symbol of Roald Amundsen was important, the person and personal 
skill had become redundant. The name and symbol of Roald Amundsen was also used 
continuously to further the agenda of the Norwegian government, which wanted to appear as 
the top polar nation in the world, and had an agenda of polar expansion, which was in many 
ways legitimized by Amundsen’s achievements and status. Later, more nations and persons 
began to use Amundsen to further their own agenda. Benito Mussolini magnified Amundsen 
to further and glorify his own Fascist state in its early years. Thommessen, it appears, used 
Amundsen to further his own agendas, and most of those who worked for or with Amundsen, 
used him as a springboard into famous careers, such as Umberto Nobile and Hjalmar Riiser-
Larsen, who both became important members of society.  
In conclusion, I find that the thesis is valid, but it raises more questions than it answers. It may 
be interesting to investigate the link between Roald Amundsen and the fledgling Soviet state, 
as Maud operated in an area under its dominion. The exact nature of the cooperation between 
Amundsen and Rolf Thommessen also warrants more investigation, and there are unanswered 
questions with regards to party politics in Norway in relation to the polar nation. Major 
questions are left unanswered in Italian sources in relation to the Fascist involvement in the 
last expedition in Amundsens career. Further detail and understanding can also be sought in 
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the USA, where archive material shedding light on the American view of the expeditions may 
be available. The last and possibly most important question that remains to be answered is the 
following: What really happened after N1 Norge landed in Teller? Who lied and who told the 
truth when the expedition was formally completed?  
I would like to end with an extract from Robert Service and his book The spell of Yukon and 
his poem “The call of the Wild”, sited by Fridtjof Nansen during the memorial service for 
Roald Amundsen: 
459
 
Have you known the Great White Silence, not a snow-gemmed twig aquiver? 
    (Eternal truths that shame our soothing lies.) 
Have you broken trail on snowshoes? mushed your huskies up the river, 
    Dared the unknown, led the way, and clutched the prize? 
Have you marked the map’s void spaces, mingled with the mongrel races, 
    Felt the savage strength of brute in every thew? 
And though grim as hell the worst is, can you round it off with curses? 
    Then hearken to the Wild – it’s wanting you. 
Have you suffered, starved and triumphed, groveled down, yet grasped at glory, 
    Grown bigger in the bigness of the whole? 
“Done things” just for the doing, letting babblers tell the story, 
    Seeing through the nice veneer the naked soul? 
Have you seen God in His splendors, heard the text that nature renders? 
    (You’ll never hear it in the family pew.) 
The simple things, the true things, the silent men who do things – 
    Then listen to the Wild – it’s calling you. 
 
  
                                                          
459
 Robert Service, The Spell of Yukon, ”The Call of the Wild”. Classicreader.com. Copyright Black Dog Media. 
URL: http://www.classicreader.com/book/269/7/ (04.11.2011). 
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